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                                 Chapter One: General Introduction
Introducing a particular research requires clarifying the major thematic areas of such research. 
Thus,  the  main  purpose  of  this  chapter  is  to  make  a  general   introduction  into  the  main 
thematic areas of my thesis. Here a brief overview about Ethiopia will be made and the core 
problem area to be under scrutiny will be described. Other than these, the research questions 
of the thesis will be stated and the major research objective of the thesis will be clarified. 
Besides,  the relevance of  the study will  be explained and the works  of  some scholars  on 
Ethiopian politics as well as the May 2005 election will be presented. Finally the structure of 
the study will be described.
1.1 Background
Ethiopia is a landlocked country located in the Horn of Africa, covering an area of 1,104,300 
sq. km (World Fact Book: 2010)1 and neighboring Eritrea to the north, Djibouti to the north 
east, Kenya to the south, Somalia to the south east and Sudan to the west. With a people of 
around 90,873,739 million (ibid), it is the second densely populated country in Sub-Sahara 
Africa. Consisting more than 80 distinct ethnic groups, it is among the most ethnically diverse 
societies of the world. The largest ethno-linguistic groups are Amhara and Oromo. While the 
Amhara constitute 26.9% of the overall ethnic group, the Oromo comprise 34.5% accordingly 
(ibid). In terms of religion, 43.5% are orthodox, 33.9% are muslim and 18.6% are protestants 
(ibid).  The national economy depends on the agricultural sector which engages  85% of the 
total employment (ibid) and is one of the poorest economies of the world. Its recent political 
history stretches from 1991 to present. The EPRDF came to power in 1991 by ousting the 
Derg regime through military force and introduced changes in  the political  sphere.  Ethnic 
federalism became the basis for organizing the state structure and the country is divided into 9 
administrative regions and 2 self-ruling cities. The political system is designed on the basis of 
democratic principles and elections were conducted in 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010 for federal 
and regional parliaments respectively.
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1 See  http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld.factbook/geos/et.html for  further  details 
1.2  Statement of the Problem 
The  May  2005  national  election  of  Ethiopia  was  the  first  truly  competitive  multi-party 
electionthat the country has ever experienced in its political history. The pre-election period 
and the election day were relatively peaceful and democratic. This time, contending political 
parties  organized themselves far better  than before.  Nearly 70 political  parties as well  as 
individual  candidates  participated  in  this  election  (EuEom 2005:  11).  However,  the  main 
competing  parties  were  Ethiopian  Peoples  Revolutionary  Democratic  Front  (EPRDF) 
,Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) and United Ethiopian Democratic Front (UEDF) 
(Nordem 2005: 2). One of the major points of difference among these parties was the issue of 
ethnic  federalism.  EPRDF  believes  that  ethnic  federalism  is  the  only  viable  way  to 
accommodate the rights of nations and nationalities to self-determination up to and including 
secession (Lovise 2006: 253). CUD opposes the federal system organized along ethnic lines 
and desires to avoid Article 39 of the constitution (ibid). UEDF supports a political system 
based on ethnic grounds but opposes the rights of nationalities to secession (ibid). The other 
point of difference was the issue of land. While EPRDF continued to favor the nationalization 
of both urban and rural land, opposition parties particularly the CUD agitated the privatization 
of land (Harbeson 2005: 157). Opposition political parties (both the CUD and UEDF) also 
criticized the ruling party regarding longstanding economic problems such as food insecurity, 
agricultural stagnation, corruption...etc  as well as over foreign policy issues particularly over 
matters related to the Ethio-Eritrean conflict and the peace process (Abbink 2005: 182). 
During this election, there was significant voter registration and turnout. Around 85% of the 
total eligible population ie. 25,605,851 people registered to vote (Nordem 2005: 6). Around 
82% of this  casted their votes at more than 32,000 polling sites on the election day (Haberson 
2005: 150). Besides, the public media was open for free political debates. Political parties 
were allocated free airtime on the state media. While EPRDF gained 44 %, opposition parties 
received  56  % of  the  total  coverage  (Eu-Eom 2005:  17).  Other  than  these,  international 
monitoring missions  were also present  to  observe  this  election.  These were the European 
Union Election Observation Mission, the African Union Election Observers Team and the US-
based Carter Center Election Monitoring Mission (Carter 2009: 20).  
Despite  the positive developments  of  the pre-election period,  the post-election period was 
marred with widespread violence. This time dispute emerged among the contending parties 
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over election results. Out of the 547 single member constituencies which were arranged for the 
2005 federal legislative election (EU Eom 2005: 9), the results of 299 constituencies were 
disputed (ibid: 25). The complaint and  appeal procedures  did not succeed providing  effective 
solution to the problem (ibid: 28). Massive popular protest and human right abuse also took 
place  in  connection  with  the  electoral  conflict.  In  relation  to  two  major  violence  which 
occurred  in  Addis  Ababa  in  June  and  November  2005,  193  people  were  killed,  several 
hundreds were injured and around 30,000 people were arrested (USIP 2007: 7). In its final 
report, the inquiry commission that was designated to investigate the violence also denied the 
excessive  use of  force  by security  forces  and this  prevented  the  possibility of  restorative 
justice in the future (ibid). Besides, 111 people including leaders of the main opposition party 
(CUD), several journalists, civil society activists and 25 people in absentia (most of whom 
were  opposition  activists  in  the  diaspora)  were  charged  and tried  in  connection  with  this 
violence (Amnesty 2006: 1). After being sentenced  various prison terms as well as death 
penalty,  they requested for pardon through Ethiopian elders and all  of them were released 
(USIP 2007: 7). Several new legislations that restrict political rights and democratic spaces 
were  also  adopted   since  then.  Some  of  these  includes   the  Mass  Media  and  Access  to 
Information Proclamation,  the Charities and Societies Proclamation and the Anti-Terrorism 
Proclamation (Human Rights Watch 2010a: 44,50).
1.3 Research Question
As David Silverman (2005: 77) stated research questions provide guidance and consistency 
for a research project. They also indicate the data required for the study and the appropriate 
methods of collecting  data (ibid). Thus the major research question of my thesis is :
                 
                   What caused the 2005 electoral violence in Ethiopia? 
1.4 Research  Objective
The main objective of my study is to examine the causes of the 2005 electoral violence in 
Ethiopia in  depth.  More specifically,  the study will  analyze the underlying conditions and 
triggering factors for this violence by focusing on three core areas. These are : 
                                   
                                     The Nature of  Ethiopian  Politics. 
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                                  The  Nature of the May 2005 Election. 
                                 
                                  The  Nature of  Electoral Institutions in Ethiopia   
            
1.5 Relevance of the Study
The  relevance  of  this  study  can  be  explained  from  various  dimensions.  Firstly,  it  will 
undertake  a  systematic  causal  study on  the  2005 electoral  violence  of  Ethiopia.  Previous 
scholarly works focus mainly on explaining the election itself. Secondly, it will understand 
violence  related  to  elections  from a  peace  and  conflict  stand  point  by applying  a  recent 
conceptual framework ie. Electoral violence, to  conduct a case study on a particular country 
ie. Ethiopia. Thirdly, it will contribute its share to efforts made to prevent electoral violence 
and resolve electoral disputes peacefully by identifying the lessons that can be drawn from the 
experience of a specific country. Fourthly, it will serve as a vital historical evidence or source 
material  for  local  and international  legal  and human right  institutions  and practitioners,  if 
restorative justice  is going to take place in the future in connection with the post-election 
violence. Fifthly, it will contribute to one of the research priorities and teaching areas of the 
center for peace studies (UiT) which is studying the causes of war, conflict and violence in 
conflict and post-conflict societies.
1.6 State of Research on the Topic  
In this part, I will put forward some of the research made on Ethiopian politics in general and 
on the May 2005 election in particular.
In his article entitled “ Discomfiture of Democracy ? The 2005 Election Crisis in Ethiopia and 
its Aftermath ” Jon Abbink (2005)  examined the nature of the May 2005 election of Ethiopia 
and its effects on the country’s politics. He argued that despite the significant democratic steps 
taken by the regime in power prior to the May 2005 election; the post-election period has 
witnessed the resurgence of neo-patrimonialism and authoritarianism in the country’s political 
arena (ibid: 193). He concluded his article by arguing that the problem of securing political 
power  through  violent  means  in  today’s  Ethiopia  highlights  the  tragic  continuity  of  the 
country’s longstanding political history. 
    
                                                                         4
Lovise Aalen (2006) wrote an article named  “Ethnic Federalism and Self Determination for 
Nationalities in a Semi Authoritarian State :the Case of Ethiopia.” In this article, she assessed 
the problematic of ethnic federalism under the current state of democracy in Ethiopia.  She 
argued that although federalism is introduced by the regime in power  as a way of managing 
ethnic diversity, practically the system in itself could not mitigate ethnic conflicts effectively 
(ibid: 243-44) due to the absence of democratic way of governance and a broader pan-national 
identity  in  the  country  (ibid:  260)  She  concluded  her  article  by  arguing  that  the  future 
consequence of ethnic politics would become disastrous not only for the regime in power  but 
also for the entire country.                                    
In a study entitled  “ the culture of power in contemporary Ethiopian political life  ” Sarah 
Vaughan and Kjetil Tronvoll (2003) investigated both the formal and informal economic social 
and political power arrangements and  interactions within the Ethiopian society. They argue 
that  despite  the  enshrinement  of  international  human  right  standards  on  the  Ethiopian 
constitutions, in practice serious human right violations have continued to occur in the country 
since 1991 (ibid: 53). They concluded that the most difficult task ahead will be transforming 
the  longstanding  culture  of  violence  in  the  country  and  despite  limitations  in  terms  of 
effectiveness and independence, government initiatives to improve the  situation  need to  be 
emphasized. 
Lahra  Smith  (2009)  wrote  an  article  called  “explaining  violence  after  recent  elections  in 
Ethiopia and Kenya ” In this article she analyzed the causes of post-election violence which 
erupted in both countries in recent times in light of contending justifications for inter-ethnic 
violence. She argued that political uncertainty and violence, close election results and biased 
electoral institutions are commonplaces in African elections (ibid: 867-68) and disproportion-
ate use of force, high level of citizen protest,  problematic electoral procedures and greater 
stakes makes the cases of Ethiopia and Kenya similar (ibid). She concluded her article by 
arguing that differences in the scope of constitutional reforms are important in  affecting  the 
voting public’s reaction to highly competitive elections.
In his article named “Ethiopia’s Extended Transition”, John W. Harbeson (2005) explained the 
distinct features of the May 2005 election and the justifications for the enhanced showing of 
opposition parties during the May 2005 national elections. He argued that this election was 
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first  genuinely competed national election since the country was introduced to multi-party 
democracy (ibid: 144). However the democratic gains of pre-election period  did not last long 
due to credible accusations of electoral fraud, biased electoral administration  and  coercive 
measures taken by the regime on the opposition camp in the post-election period (ibid). He 
concluded his article by arguing that the experiences from the May 2005 election demonstrate 
that  the  democratization  process  in  Ethiopia  will  encounter   both  critical  challenges  and 
possible opportunities. 
Leonardo  R.  Arriola  (2008)  wrote  an  article  called  “ Ethnicity  Economic  Condition  and 
Opposition  Support:  Evidence  from Ethiopia’s  2005  Elections.” In  this  study,  he  made  a 
quantitative  study  on  the  major  factors  that  determine  the  degree  of  support  given  to 
opposition political parties at electoral district level in the May 2005 election. He argued that 
the various tactics used by most African regimes for securing victory during elections such as 
patronage allocation, ethnic polarization and violence application also works for the Ethiopian 
case (ibid: 115). From the study, he found out that economic factors played a crucial role in 
determining  the  level  of  support  obtained  by  opposition  political  parties  in  a  particular 
electoral district (ibid: 117). He concluded his article by arguing that future research needs to 
focus on analyzing how economic dynamics  is  influencing the long-established  political 
alignments.
In his  article  titled  “Alternative Electoral  Systems and the 2005 Ethiopian Parliamentary 
Elections” John  Ishiyama  2009,  examined  whether  or  not  the  employment  of  alternative 
electoral system would have made the outcome of the May 2005 election distinct. In his study, 
he found that in contrast to opposition parties request for the institution of the proportional 
representation system before the May 2005 national election, they would have done best in 
terms of  vote share under the block plurality system (ibid: 49). He concluded his article by 
arguing that the choice of electoral system will be an important variable in determining the 
outcome of multiparty elections in particular and the course of the  democratic transitions in 
general in the future Ethiopia.
Lovise Aalen and Kjetil Tronvoll (2009) wrote an article named  “ The End of Democracy? 
Curtailing Political and Civil Rights in Ethiopia” In this article, they made a critical analysis 
on the political changes that occurred after the May 2005 national election in Ethiopia. They 
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argued that this election witnessed exceptional political liberalization at the initial stage (ibid: 
194) but this was reversed in the post-election period due to a stage by stage closure of the 
political  arena by the regime (ibid).  Such measures undermine the prospect for a peaceful 
political  resistance and heightens the likelihood for long term violent conflict (ibid). They 
concluded the  article  by arguing  that  all  these  developments  confirm that  the  regime has 
eventually resumed its authoritarian essence.  
From the research  made on Ethiopian politics in general and on the May 2005 election in 
particular one can understand that the risk of election related violence became high in the 
Ethiopian case due to political  factors such as neopatrimonialism,  authoritarianism, use of 
violence, biased election administration, contested electoral systems ...etc and due to socio-
economic  factors  such  as  greater  stakes,  ethnic  polarization,  economic  inequalities,  social 
injustice ..etc. These factors will also continue to be challenges not only to the  peace-building 
efforts but also to the democatization initiatives  undergoing  in the country.
1.7 Organization of the study
The subsequent parts of this thesis are organized into four chapters. The second chapter deals 
with methodological issues and experiences from the field. Specifically it explains how the 
research is designed and what sort of methods are used. It also brief  how access is  negotiated 
and data is collected in the field. Besides, it discusses safety and insider-outsider status issues 
raised in the course of fieldwork.  The third chapter presents the theoretical  framework of 
electoral violence from the existing literature.  The main focus of this chapter is to explain 
electoral  violence  in  post-conflict  societies.  Particularly,  it  describes  the  meaning,  nature, 
effects and causes of electoral violence. In line with the purpose of this thesis, more emphasis 
is given to the  explanation forwarded on the causes of electoral violence. The fourth  chapter 
firstly reviews the May 2005 Election of Ethiopia by classifying it into Pre-election, Election 
day and Post-election period. Secondly it analyzes the causes of the 2005 electoral violence in 
Ethiopia. This part is divided into three sub parts. The first sub-part considers the nature of 
politics in contemporary Ethiopia. Here issues like neo-patrimonial and authoritarian politics, 
ethnic and political party cleavages as well as  use of violence and culture of impunity are 
discussed. The second sub-part examines the nature of the May 2005 election of Ethiopia. This 
part covers subjects such as political mobilization along conflict margins,  close competition 
among political parties and pertinent socio-economic stakes. The third sub-part explores the 
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nature  of  electoral  institutions  in  post-conflict  Ethiopia.  Problems  such  as  contests  over 
existing electoral system, limited regulations of electoral conduct and weak electoral  adminis-
tration entity are analyzed here. In the final chapter, I will summarize the lessons drawn from 
the Ethiopian experience and forward  the concluding remarks of  this thesis.
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                      Chapter Two:Methodology and  Fieldwork Experience
Clarifying  methodological issues is an important step in any research process. Thus, the main 
purpose  of  this  chapter  is  to  present  the  methodology used  in  my thesis  as  well  as  my 
experiences from the fieldwork. Specifically, the way in which the research is designed and 
the methods are chosen will be clarified. Besides, the manner in which access is negotiated 
and data's are collected will be explained. Moreover, the way in which  my insider-outsider 
status played a role on the challenges encountered and measures taken in terms of safety in the 
field will be analysed.
2.1 Research Design and Method  
With respect to research approaches, David Silverman (2006: 15) argued that methodology 
refers to the process of choosing data  collection and analysis  methods appropriate  for the 
research to be conducted and can be classified into qualitative and quantitative ones. Methods 
are the particular techniques used to conduct a research and are required to be consistent with 
the theories to be used in the research (ibid). Adrian Holliday (2000: 6) said that qualitative 
studies explore the attributes of social life in depth by situating the study in a particular social 
setting. While designing my research, a qualitative approach is chosen in order to collect and 
analyze relevant data.
                                                                          
As to sources of study, Alan Bryman (2004: 381) argued that researchers can utilize a variety 
of  documentary sources to conduct a qualitative study such as written and visual personal 
documents, official documents of government and private organizations, printed and visual 
mass media products  and electronic  sources.  Yin (2009:  105) also argued that  researchers 
should  gather  documents  needed to  address  research questions  in  a  systematic  way.  They 
should also recognize the purpose of such written documents so that they can interpret the 
information within these documents properly (ibid). Various  types of documentary sources are 
supposed to be consulted while planning my study.
In my study, I am using the May 2005 election  as a case in point . As Yin (2009: 4) argued 
that case study is utilized as a research method so as to build a knowledge about specific 
individual and group attributes, organizational settings and socio-political events. The May 
2005 election 
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of Ethiopia was a socio-political phenomenon that involved diverse stakeholders such as the 
national  election  board,  the  contending  political  parties,  the  voting  public,  domestic  and 
international observers, local and foreign medias, civil organizations and others. It is  in light 
of  this fact that  I planned to travel to Ethiopia  and visit the institutions of these stakeholders 
in search of primary and secondary documentary data relevant for my study. 
In my study, theory is used as an important methodological tool. As Robert Yin (2009: 130) 
explained,  theoretical  suppositions  will  not  only  imply  the  objectives,  questions  and 
hypothesis of a specific case study but also the literatures to be reviewed and the method to be 
used  for  data  collection.  The  conceptual  framework  of  electoral  violence  developed  by 
Kristina Høglund (2009: 423) indicates that the causes of electoral violence in conflict ridden 
societies are identified in three major spheres. These are the nature of politics, the nature of 
elections and the nature electoral institutions. So this  framework helped me to design the 
objectives and the questions of my research.  It  also assisted me to decide the appropriate 
methods for  collecting the required data. Moreover it assisted me to identify the institutions 
that I should visit and the relevant documents that I should search for the study purpose. This 
theory will also be used to make a causal analysis on the issue under study.2
The  literatures  that  I  reviewed  have  also  played  an  important  role  in  identifying  the 
appropriate  methodology for  my research.3 For instance Høglund (2009:  414)  argued that 
reports  organized  by  both  domestic  and  international election  monitoring agencies are key 
documentary sources in order to study electoral violence. From the reports prepared by the 
Kenyan Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence (CIPEV 2008: 21-36) and the 
Kenyan  National  Commission  on  Human  Rights  (KNCHR 2008:  20-30),  I  observed  that 
documentary  information  is  extensively  used  in  order  to  analyze  the  causes  of  the  2007 
electoral violence in Kenya. I also reviewed some documents related to the May 2005 election 
of Ethiopia.4In this                                        10
2  Casual analysis is a study method that strives to find out independent variables that explain or justify a specific 
dependent variable. Ruane Janet (2005:76)
3 Some of these are  From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peace building by Timothy  D. Sisk  & Anna  K. 
Jarstad(2008), Electoral Violence in Conflict-Ridden Societies: Concepts, Causes and Consequences” by Kristine 
Høglund (2009),“Elections  in  Fragile  States:  Between Voice  and Violence”  by Timothy D.  Sisk(2008)These 
literatures analyze the nexus between democracy  and violence and theorize electoral violence as a distinct type 
of political violence. 
4 These are  Ethiopia: Legislative Elections 2005: Final Report  by EU Election Observation Mission (2005), 
Ethiopia: Prisoners of Conscience on Trial for Treason: Opposition Party Leaders, Human Rights Defenders and  
Journalists a report by Amnesty International (2006) and Country of Origin Information Report on Ethiopia by 
regard, Chris Hart (1998: 44) argued that literature review is  “about evaluating the logical 
coherence of theories, methodologies and findings in a context of informed scholarship” and 
establishing what has already been done on this particular topic.  
                                                                                       
With regard to my insider-outsider status and its impact on my fieldwork in Ethiopia; I argue 
that on the one hand my previous background and local knowledge which includes; being a 
student of political  science and international relations with critical  views on my country`s 
political developments ie. Ethiopia, being an Ex- staff member of  a highly politicised state 
office ie. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia with an understanding of the internal and 
external affairs of the state,5  being an Ethiopian national and a resident of Addis Ababa who 
participated in the May 2005 election as a voter and observed its violent aftermath ; makes me 
a  insider.  On  the  other  hand my current  career  and  residential  status  such  as  ;  being  an 
overseas student  who is  doing research on a politically sensitive topic  with funding from 
institutions  of  a  foreign  country that  once  experienced  a  troubled  diplomatic  relations  ie. 
Norway and being a diaspora who returned to Ethiopia from a country where opposition and 
rebel groups critical to the Ethiopian government also reside and in a situation where state 
authorities heightened suspicions towards diaspora's returning to Ethiopia in politically critical 
periods; constitute my outsider status. Moreover, I believe that my insider-outsider status has 
played a mixed role during my fieldwork in Ethiopia. On the one hand, it  contributed both to 
the  opportunities  I  gained  and the  obstacles  I  encountered  in  terms  of  accessing relevant 
documentary data.  On the other hand it  played an important role both in the challenges I 
encountered and the measures I took in terms of my  personal safety.   
2.2  Access Negotiation and Data Collection
Concerning access to data,  Corrine Glesne (2006: 44) stated that,  researchers whose studies 
involve organizations are obliged to meet with the gatekeepers of these institutions. These 
gatekeepers are authorized to “grant or deny initial access and make access either more or less 
difficult.” (Feldman &others 2003: 31). Before commencing my data collection task, I have 
submitted my letter of cooperation to all the institutions I visited to secure their consent for 
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the UK Home office(2006). These reports cover the political and human right issues in Ethiopia and  provide 
reliable information on the May 2005 election of Ethiopia.
5  After graduating from Addis Ababa University with a Bachelor degree in Political Science and International 
Relations in July 2003; I worked as a Diplomatic Attache at the Directorate -General of  Ethiopian Expatriates 
Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia for two years.  Attache` refers to ``an official, under the 
authority of an Ambassador or other head of a diplomatic mission, who serves either as a diplomat or as a 
member of the support staff.” (Source: Wikipedia, an online encyclopedia, 30.09.2010)
sharing relevant  data.6 Nearly all  of  them required me to clarify the specific  topic  of my 
research before granting  permission access to relevant data and I did so. Moreover, most of 
the letters which I submitted to government organizations went through higher authorities ie. 
deputy ministers and commissioners to secure their approval. 
During  my  fieldwork  I  have  visited  forty  different  institutions  and  secured  relevant 
documentary data   from twenty two institutions. For  instance  from the  National  Election 
Board    of Ethiopia, I have obtained the Board` s report  on the May 2005 election to the 
national parliament  and different electoral rules and regulations used by the Board to manage 
national and local elections. I have got the  report of the independent commission  of inquiry 
on  the  Post  -May  2005  election  violence  and  the  new   proclamations  on  civil  society 
organizations,  anti-terrorism  and  broadcasting  services  from  the  House  of  Peoples 
Representatives.  From  the  Ethiopian  Human  Rights  Council,  I  have  secured  different 
compilations of reports and press releases  on the situation of  human rights in Ethiopia (2002-
2006) and a special report of  EHRCO on the May 2005 election of Ethiopia. I have obtained 
election  related  evaluations  reports,  press  releases  and  party  program  bulletins  from  the 
political  offices  of  EPRDF,  CUD  and  UEDF.  I  have  also  secured  articles  written  on 
democracy,  elections,   political  parties  and  human  rights  in  Africa  from the  Institute  for 
Security  Studies.  I  have  also  bought  books  written  by  prominent  Ethiopian  scholars  and 
politicians  on  the  May  2005  election  such  as  Agetuni- Temren  Wetan  by  Prof.  Mesfin 
Woldemariam  and  Ye Nesanet Goh Siked by Dr Birhanu Nega. These documents are written 
both  in  Amharic  and  in  English  and  nearly  all  would  be  unavailable  electronically.7 My 
findings also demonstrate the success that I have achieved in applying the documentary data 
collection method.
Besides this, I have collected secondary documentary data related to the May  2005 election 
from  the  university´s  library  as  well  as  from  the  Internet,  while  I  was  in  Tromsø.  The 
institutional reports include election monitoring reports issued by the EU election observation 
missions and the Carter election observers mission, human right reports issued by international 
non-governmental  organizations  like  Amnesty International  and  Human Rights  Watch  and 
country reports published by foreign government offices like the UK home office and the US 
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6  There is no central government organisation or research council in Ethiopia that grant research permission for 
students and researchers coming from overseas. The data collection task was carried out for 6 weeks ie. From 
June 28 to August 6,2010. 
7  A full information about the various institutions visited can be obtained from the list attached in the appendix.
state department. Articles and books written by prominent scholars  on Ethiopian politics and 
society such as Jon Abbink, Kjetil Tronvoll and Lovise Aalen as well  as the works of other 
emerging  scholars  were  also  collected.  The  news  archives  of  some  international  media 
organizations  such  as  the  BBC  and  websites  of  the  Ethiopian  Diaspora  such  as 
Ethiomedia.com were also consulted. All of these document  are written in English .
With regard to access challenges, Raymond Lee (1995: 20) argued that state authorities in 
conflict societies  tend to restrict access to information so as to prevent the leakage of sensitive 
information. The authorities of two governmental organizations have imposed restrictions on 
my access to relevant data during data collection due to the political sensitivity of the data. 
These are the Ethiopian Radio and Television Authority and the National Election Board of 
Ethiopia.  At  the  Ethiopian  Radio  Television  Authority  I  was  denied  the  copy  of  the 
videocassettes of the Pre-May 2005 election Inter party debates. I was allowed only to see 
these videos at the audio visual room of the Authority.  At the National Election Board of 
Ethiopia I was allowed to copy of a number of relevant documents to my study. However  my 
request to copy a document which contains a letter written by the National Election Board of 
Ethiopia to the Federal  Police Commission of Ethiopia was rejected by authorities. 
Likewise most policy officers in sub-Saharan Africa also “shy away from policy issues for fear 
of political repercussions, government clamp down, fear of being labeled as anti -government 
and the consequences that go with it.”(Gokah 2006: 67). One non-governmental and two inter-
governmental organizations have restricted my access due to one of the above reasons. These 
are Justice for All- Prison Fellowship, the EU delegation office and the AU commission Head 
office in Addis Ababa. At Justice for All ,I was denied a document which contains information 
about the reconciliation and pardoning process that was initiated by prominent Ethiopians ie. 
the elders committee to resolve the political standoff which lasted for 2 years after the May 
2005 national election.  Officials of  the European Union Delegation Office in Addis Ababa 
have also denied me a  document that explain the role of the so-called Ambassadors of Donors 
Group in mediating the conflict between the ruling party and the major opposition parties over 
the  result  of  the  May 2005 election.  An officer  at  the  AU commission  Head office  have 
attempted to restrict my already permitted access to the African Union Election Observation 
Mission Report on the May 2005 election of Ethiopia.
Moreover, I could not secure any relevant documentary data from twelve institutions for 
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various  reasons.  Studies  related  to  my research  were  neither  made  nor  retained  in  seven 
institutions. These are National Ombudsman Authority, National Library and Archive Center, 
World  Bank  Ethiopia,  Ethiopian  Economic  Association,  Institute  of  Peace  and  Security 
Studies and Institute of Ethiopian studies at Addis Ababa University and the Book Center at 
A.A.U. Moreover I could not find any worthy data from the offices of three political parties. 
These are UDJP, EDP and AEUP.8 Officials of these political  parties told me that they do not 
retain  party  documents  related  to  the  May  2005  election  currently  because  they  were 
confiscated  by  the  government  following  the  Post-May  2005  election  violence  and  the 
crackdown of opposition groups by the ruling party . I have also been waiting to hear from 
two other institutions that promised to send me vital materials related  to my study but got no 
response up to now.  
Despite the restrictions which I encountered, I have managed to get some of the data from 
alternative  sources.  In  regard  to  this  Glesne  C.(2006:  44)  argued that “sometimes  denied 
access  may  turn  out  for  the  best.”  For  instance  Although  I  was   denied  the  copy  of 
videocassettes of the Pre-May 2005 election Inter Party Debates by the Ethiopian Radio and 
Television Authority, I have obtained these debates in a report-hard copy format from an NGO 
that worked on the issue during the may 2005 election ie. the Inter Africa Group. I have also 
received  documents that are similar to the one that I was denied by the National Election 
Board of Ethiopia from the currently operating CUD party office. I could not obtain an already 
available hard copy of news compilations for the year 2005\2006 from the news archives of 
two institutions due to technical, financial and time constraints. These are the Ethiopian Press 
Agency and the office of the Reporter Newspaper. Later on I managed to get copy of a one 
year compiled election news (2005\2006) from the Ethiopian News Agency. In the case of the 
African Union, I have managed to get the report of African Union  Election Observers Mission 
from the  archive  of   political  section  of  AU by overcoming  the  gate  keeper  problems  I 
encountered  in this organization. However, I have missed the documents that I have expected 
to obtain from the EU delegation office in Addis and the local NGO-Justice for All. No other 
alternative source retains the documents which I was looking for from these two institutions 
other than themselves.            
Here  I  also  want  to  emphasize  the  role  that  my project  proposal  has  played  during  data 
collection. As Silverman D.(2005: 139) stated preparing a research proposal enables 
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8 UDJP refers to the Unity for Democracy and Justice Party, EDP means Ethiopia democratic Party and 
AEUP is All Ethiopians Unity Party.
researchers  to  have  a  clear  understanding  about  the  theoretical,  methodological  and  other 
important  issues connected to their evolving research projects. I have prepared a research 
proposal prior to data collection. Thus, the theories and concepts I reviewed on this proposal 
helped me to recall the important issues related to my study and to evaluate my daily data 
collection experience. Moreover the safety measures I planned including my data collection 
method assisted me to protect my security and make a safe exit from the field. In general I can 
say that my project proposal has served me as an important guidance tool and helped me so 
much to finalize my data collection task effectively.                        
2.3 Issues of Safety and Insider-Outsider Status
As Raymond  Lee  (1995:  20)  stated  that  gatekeepers  in  conflict  societies  will  “allow the 
research to go ahead but only under restrictive conditions that allow them to monitor and 
control  the  researcher.” Moreover,  the background and motive of researchers conducting 
fieldwork in conflict situations is usually subjected to both formal and informal investigation 
and surveillance by state authorities (Lee 1993: 125; 1995: 17)(Thomson 2009: 119).  I have 
encountered strict security clearance and serious interrogation about my personal background 
and purpose of my research  from two of the government institutions I visited while negotiting 
access.  These  are  the  House  of  Peoples  Representatives  of  Ethiopia  and  the  office  of 
Government Communication Affairs. I visited the House of Peoples Representatives to find 
the report of the independent commission of inquiry on the violence that followed the May 
2005 national election. I also went  to the office of Government Communications Affairs in 
search  of  documents  containing  the  policies,  strategies  and  programs  of  the  Ethiopian 
government in the economic, social and political and other spheres. In both institutions, the 
respective  authorities  took  me  to  their  office  and  interviewed  me  about  my  personal 
background and purpose of my research for more than an hour. The officer at the Government 
Communication Affairs officer also tried to approach me as a friend and tap more information 
about my previous background and daily research experience in Addis Ababa as well as my 
current  status  and life  experience in  Norway.  Other  than this,  the officer  at  the House of 
Peoples  Representatives  argued  that  my  thesis  should  cover  not  only  the  negative 
developments in the post-election period but also the positive developments of the pre-election 
period. Similarly the officer at Office of Government Communications Affairs insisted me to 
use the written responses prepared by  his organization  to the US state department human 
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right report as important references for my study.9 The reasons for all these measures were the 
suspicion of state authorities over my background and purpose of my research as well as to 
pursue  further surveillance on me.  
It has been found out  that clarifying the purpose, funding source and institutional linkages of 
a particular research project to the research subjects may result in not only opportunities but 
also to challenges (Martin-Ortega&Herman 2009: 232). Geraldine Lee-Treweek & Stephanie 
Linkogle  (2001: 11) argued that  “research on communites under threat, for example in high 
crime areas,war zones, and in situations where torture and political repression occurs, also 
presents obvious and immediate dangers to researchers.” Moreover,  “Accusations of spying 
are presumably most common in situations of conflict or tension” (Lee 1993: 6). In the case of 
my study, the clarification I made about my research while negotiating access contributed not 
only to the opportunities I got in terms of collecting relevant documentary data but also to the 
challenges  that  I  encountered  in  terms  of  my  personal  safety  during  my  fieldwork.  For 
instance, although the documents that I was searching for were available in both the House of 
Peoples  Representatives  and the office of  Government  Communications  Affairs,  accessing 
them required me to pass through an overly scrutiny. Also it is not hard to imagine how state 
authorities may react when I reveal the purpose of my research which has serious political 
implications. For instance the official at the House of Peoples Representatives reminded me of 
the sensitivity of my research topic and the possible challenges I might face during my search 
for relevant  data.  The authority at  the office of Government  Communications  Affairs  was 
surprised by my courage to come and request for information on such sensitive topic from his 
organization which he argues is a political institution. Moreover, since my research on this 
politically sensitive topic is financed by institutions of a foreign country ie. Norway which has 
experienced a problematic relation with the Ethiopian government for about two years after 
the May 2005 election, state authorities might have perceived me as an agent working for a 
foreign government. At the time, Ethiopian authorities accused Norway of having ties with 
rebel groups in Ogaden ie. a somali region in Ethiopia and expelled most of the diplomats 
working for the Norwegian Embassy in Addis. Thus,I believe that the previous problematic 
relations of Ethiopia and Norway as well as my current credential as an outsider researcher 
have contributed their share to the safety problems I encountered in the field. I further argue 
that I would not have faced such challenges if I have used a covert research method and things 
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''Ethiopia: Government set to manipulate western researchers.'' september 1st, 2010, Available at  
http://www.ethiopianreview.com/articles/33273
could have been different if I were in Ethiopia for a purpose other than research.   
                                                                    
Experiences show that familiarity does not always ensure safety due to “unpredictable events 
stemming from suspicion, change of political climate and traditional\cultural conservatism” 
(Gokah 2006: 64). The identity of researchers and how they are perceived by others will also 
influence  their  own  personal  safety  (Martin-Ortega  &  Herman  2009:  238).  My previous 
background as an insider and the current status as an outsider  has also contributed to the 
safety challenges that encountered during data collection in Ethiopia. The Ethiopian Foreign 
Ministry is among the few key and highly politicized institutions in the country. After the May 
2005 election of Ethiopia, there was a high rate of resignations, dismissals and defections of 
diplomats both from the headquarter and missions abroad. The reasons for this range from 
personal to political factors. This was of a great concern for the Ethiopian government because 
all of us left the ministry along with our knowledge about the internal and external affairs of 
the state including the sensitive ones. I resigned from the Ministry three months after the May 
2005 election due to personal reasons. I opted to advance my studies and engage myself in 
other carrier rather than becoming a representative of  an authoritarian state. In fact here I 
cannot deny my own sympathy to those who struggle to bring about a genuine democracy and 
respect for human rights in my home country.  Lee (1995: 23) also argued that  “complete 
neutrality is  probably impossible.”  However  my case study will  continue to  maintain its 
impartiality   because  it  will  be  based  on  the  theoretical  arguments  of  electoral  violence. 
Moreover, as of the May 2005 election where the majority of the Ethiopian Diaspora provided 
a political support for opposition parties, the ruling party has become very suspicious about 
the role of the Ethiopian Diaspora in the country`s politics. State authorities are also aware of 
the  fact  that  most  of  the  reports,  researches  and news issued  in  the  past  by international 
organizations, foreign governments and scholars about the May 2005 Ethiopian election were 
very critical towards the Ethiopian government. Other than these, I suspect that my Amhara 
ethnic background might also had contributed to the low level of trust I came across while 
negotitating  access  in  some  government  offices.  Historical  studies  show that  the  Amhara 
ethnic group dominated the power politics of  both the ancient and modern Ethiopian political 
history.  However  the  past  two decades  witnessed the  predominance of  the  Tigrean  ethnic 
group in  the  country's  politics.  Studies  made on ethnic  federalism and ethnic  conflicts  in 
Ethiopia have also proved that ethnic identity is highly politicized in contemporary Ethiopia. 
In general, the above factors served as a ground  not only to the suspicions of state authorities 
on me and my research but also to the subsequent interrogations and surveillances which I 
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encountered during my fieldwork in Ethiopia.
Scholars argue that researchers should have a good knowledge about the history and recent 
political situation of the country so that they can anticipate potential risks and take required 
measures  (Martin-Ortega&Herman  2009:  227).  Moreover  researchers   should  take  into 
account  the local  context  of conflict  societies  so that  they can plan and execute  effective 
research projects (Bøas&others 2006: 71). Recently, scholars categorized the regime in power 
in Ethiopia  as an electoral authoritarian regime (Schedler 2006: 3). The country` s human 
right record in the past two decades is also worrisome.10 Due to the painful experiences in the 
past,  the  perception  of  many  Ethiopians  towards  politics  is  negative  (Aalen  2002:  32). 
Engaging in politics is usually perceived as full of uncertainities and insecurities. Similarly, 
participating in a political research is also considered as tantamount to involving in politics. 
For instance the EU election observers mission to Ethiopia  reported the restriction of political 
space  and the  impacts  of   the  troublesome experiences  of  the  May 2005 election  on  the 
country`s  politics  and  society.11 Moreover  in  Ethiopia,  due  to  a  newly  introduced  anti-
terrorism legislation, any activity related to politics specially by an outsider is perceived and 
interpreted by state authorities as a potential threat to security. Evidences also show that the 
broad  definition of a terrorist act  within this law is being used to silence opposition views 
and activities and  justify the arbitrary actions of security forces in Ethiopia.12 For instance a 
researcher who tried to contact a particular rebel group for a research purpose or a journalist 
who attempted to report an opposition political protest can be charged as a collaborator of 
terrorist  and  may serve  substantial  prison  terms.  Since  I  am a  researcher  with  Ethiopian 
nationality, the risk of arbitrary actions due to this law also concerns me. Besides this, recently 
the Ethiopian government has introduced a new civil society and charities proclamation. By 
this law, international NGO`s as well as Ethiopian NGO`s with more than 10% their finances 
originating from foreign sources are prohibited from working on areas of democracy, good 
governance,  human  rights.  This  law  also  has  provisions  that  restrict  the  exchange  of 
information on these areas and imposes harsh penalty on trespassers.13 So the kind of fear that 
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10    See  For instance the US State Dept.(2006), Ethiopia: Report on Human Right Practices 2005.
11 See Eu-Eom Ethiopia:House of Peoples Representatives and State Council Elections, May 2010 Final report 
( Eu-Eom 2010:1,2,3,4,22 &23) 
12 See Human Rights Watch's 'Anaysis of Ethiopia's draft anti-terrorism law' ( Hrw2009:1,3,5,7&10 ) The draft 
law  was  approved  by  the  parliament  and  came  into  force  in  August  2009  without   any  significant 
adjustments.Also see Human Rights Watch report entitled  Ethiopia: One Hundred Ways of Putting Pressure. 
(Hrw2010:50)
13 See also Human Rights Watch's  ' Analysis of Ethiopia's Draft CSO Law' (Hrw2008:1,3,4,8,9) The draft law 
was approved by the parliament and came into force in February 2009 without  any significant  adjustments.
I observed in some of the NGO`s I visited while negotiating access for a political and human 
right related data could be related to this provision. Although these legislations were initiated 
to narrow down political  spaces prior to the 2010 national election,  they remained legally 
effective even after this election because they  already  have became parts of the laws of the 
country. Hence, these realities have influenced the data collection techniques I applied as well 
as other safety measure I took during my fieldwork.   
                                                                                  
It is argued that since “conflict zones are not places of free intellectual debate and objective 
discourse”,  researchers should be reserved from provoking unnecessary discourse with state 
authorities on politically sensitive issues (Romano 2006: 440). In fact conducting research on 
political topics is challenging because it touch issues that concern those who hold political 
power or that are controversial within the society (Lee 1993: 4,145) (Martin-Ortega&Herman 
2009:  234).  Besides  being  a  naïve  researcher,  doing  research  on  the  causes  of  the  2005 
electoral violence in Ethiopia was a risky task for me due to the political sensitivity of the 
topic. Evidences show that state authorities have played a major role in the violence.14 It is for 
this reason that my independent research project on this delicate issue attracted the attention of 
state  authorities while negotiating access. The restrictions imposed on my access to relevant 
documents and the serious interrogations that I encountered in these institutions  also proved 
the sensitivity of my research topic. As Lee (1995: 25) argued “ in conflict situations, trying to 
obtain multiple perspectives on particular events may put one`s existing social relations at 
risk.” In the case of my field work, I was visiting various state and non-state institutions in 
search of relevant documentary data.  My assumption was that collecting information from 
multiple sources will help me to enrich my study by entertaining diverse perspectives on the 
issue.  But  I  did  not  anticipate  the  risk  that  goes  with  doing  this  kind  of  research  while 
designing it. What happened on the ground was that the more I multiplied the institutions I 
visited, the more I immersed my self into high level of suspicion and subsequent surveillance 
by state authorities. Lee (1995: 24) also stated that  the capacity of researcher`s to forward 
questions can be restricted by their insider status. For instance “ a researcher who is a member 
of a particular culture may invite only incredulity by asking questions about it ” (ibid: 25). In 
Ethiopia, human rights abuse cases are not properly investigated  by the state authorities due 
to the prevalence of culture of impunity.15 So any critical and investigative studies on such 
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issues particularly by an ex-insider-current outsider like me can be considered as a threat to 
their political power and state's sovereignity. In this  regard, Lee (1993: 6) also noted that “ the 
presence of a researcher is sometimes feared because it produces the possibility that deviant 
activities will be revealed.” So, to avoid situations that may jeopardize my personal safety, I 
refrained from opening a discourse with state authorities over this controversial issue.  
                                                                    
Studies also show that, since authorities of conflict zones and authoritarian regimes may abuse 
the right of informants who participate in politically sensitive research,  researchers should 
protect the identity of the researched (Romano 2006: 441)(Mertus 2009: 166)(Norman 2009: 
80).  It is also argued that specific contextual factors such as levels of violence, state control 
and  population  fractionalizations  will  influence  the  methodological  choice  of  researchers 
conducting  field  work  in  conflict  and  post-conflict  societies  (Paluck  2009:  39).  Previous 
studies indicated the challenges compounding political research in Ethiopia (Aalen 2002:32). 
Recently   Human  rights  watch  also  explained  the  problems  of  undertaking  human  right 
related research in Ethiopia and stressed the importance of a covert research. Specifically it 
stated that “ Ethiopia is one of the most challenging environment for human rights research on 
the  African  continent.”  (HRW  2010a:  7,  2010b:  10).  Current  evidences  show  that “the 
consequences for victims and witnesses of speaking out about their situation can be extremely 
serious” (HRW :2010b: 10).  Therefore  “any kind of independent information gathering, and 
particularly  human  rights  research,  carries  such  risks  and  must  be  conducted  in  secrecy” 
(ibid). These challenges are always out there whether the researcher is an insider, an outsider 
or both like me. My own research experience also confirms this fact. Furthermore, I went to 
Ethiopia  in  a  politically  critical  period  ie.  just  one  month  after  the  May  2010  election. 
Although  the  results  of  the  election  were  publicized,  they  were  disputed  by  the  major 
contending parties. Security was highly tightened to prevent any violence that may erupt due 
to disputed results.  My own observations in the course of my fieldwork as well  as recent 
studies show that the capacity of the government to control its population both in urban and 
rural areas has increased tremendously due to the entrenchment of its administrative structures 
even at the lower level of the society. The government has also expanded the patronage system 
throughout  the  country.  On  the  one  hand,  the  ruling  party's  members  and  supporters  are 
entitled  with  different  economic  and  political  rewards  and  benefits.  On  the  other  hand, 
opposition group members and supporters are concerned about current political uncertainities 
and insecurities. Thus, to avoid situations that may immerse my potential informants into risks 
of arbitrary actions of security forces, I declined from conducting interview on this delicate 
issue.                                                              20
Lastly, I argue that the current political realities in Ethiopia has also influenced my choice of 
data transfer means. In this regard, Elisabeth Woods (2006: 381) stated that researchers in 
conflict zone usually encounter problems in terms of  ensuring “ the security of data gathered 
particularly  sensitive  data  that  might  have  political  implications  if  in  the  wrong  hands.” 
Particularly, the new anti-terrorism law has  granted state authorities the right to intercept the 
telephone conversation, the email and the postal correspondences of any individual if deemed 
necessary. Moreover,  this law requires service providing entities such as telecom and postal 
service  agencies,  banks,  hotels  ...etc  to  disclose  any information  relevant  to  security  and 
intelligence officials when the need arises. Although court warant is required to do this in 
principle, this does not necessarly prevent the security officials of an authoritarian state from 
taking arbitrary actions in practice.  Since I have clarified my contact details to authorities 
during the interrogations I encountered in two state institutions, I was sure that those details of 
mine were also being used to pursue surveillance activities on me. I also suspect that some of 
the puzzling incidents I encountered in the field were the results of such activities. Thus, to 
minimize  safety risks,  I  have  limited  my informal  relations  and made precautious  on  the 
telephone conversations as well as the postal and e-mail correspondences I made while I was 
in Ethiopia. For instance I opted to send  the documentary data which I collected from about 
20 institutions back to Tromsø via an international private postal service agency ie. DHL. I 
also kept the copies of these documents in a safe place in case of failure in mail delivery. Thus 
my local  knowledge  as  an  insider  has  assisted  me  to  apply  the  appropriate  data  transfer 
method in and finish my documentary data collection task successfully. 
In  this  chapter,  I  have  presented  the  methodological  issues  related  to  my  thesis  and  my 
experience from the fieldwork. Firstly, I have clarified how the research was designed and the 
methods were chosen. Secondly, I have explained how access was negotiated and data's were 
collected.  Thirdly,  I  have  analyzed  how  my  insider-outsider  status  played  a  role  on  the 
challenges I encountered and measures I took in terms safety in the field. 
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             Chapter Three: Theoretical Framework of Electoral Violence 
Understanding the theoretical assumptions of a particular topic is a major task in any research. 
Thus, the main purpose of this chapter is to forward the theoretical framework of electoral 
violence  from existing literatures. Specifically,  the meaning, nature and effects of electoral 
violence  will  be   described  briefly.  Moreover,  the  explanations  concerning  how electoral 
violence is caused will be presented broadly. The facilitating conditions and  triggering factors 
for  such violence are categorized into three major areas. These are the nature of politics, the 
nature of elections and electoral institutions. 
3.1 Meaning, Nature and Effects of Electoral Violence
The problems associated with  the democratization process in several parts of the globe were 
indicated by many. They argue that democracy; increases the risk of armed conflict in newly 
democratizing nations (Mansfield & Snyder 2007: 163), heightens the probability of violent 
conflict in post conflict societies (Jarstad 2008: 29) and increases the risk of political violence 
in low income countries (Collier 2009: 11). Current studies also show that violence related to 
elections has become a prevalent phenomenon. Out of 57 countries that held elections in 2001, 
violent conflicts were witnessed  in 14 countries (24.5%) (Fischer 2002: 11). In the case of 
Africa, violence affects  from 19 to 25 percent of elections (Bekoe 2010: 1). Some of the 
countries that experienced such incidences in recent times include  Afghanistan, Bangladesh, 
Burundi, Cambodia, Colombia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Guyana, Haiti, Iraq, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka and Zimbabwe (Sisk 2008: 2-3,IDEA 2006: 57).  
Relatively few researchers and practitioners have made an effort to define and conceptualize 
electoral  violence.  Liisa  Laakso  (2007:  227-8)  defined  electoral  violence  as  “  an  activity 
motivated  by  an  attempt  to  affect  the  results  of  the  elections  either  by  manipulating  the 
electoral procedure and participation or by contesting the legitimacy of the results. It might 
involve voters’ and candidates’ intimidation, killings, attacks against their property, forceful 
displacement, unlawful detentions and rioting.” 
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According to  the United Nations Development Program (2009: 4), Election-related violence 
refers to:- 
“acts  or threats  of coercion,  intimidation,  or physical  harm perpetrated to affect  an 
electoral process or that arise in the context of electoral competition. When perpetrated 
to affect an electoral process, violence may be employed to influence the process of 
elections—such  as  efforts  to  delay,  disrupt,  or  derail  a  poll—and  to  influence  the 
outcomes: the determining of winners in competitive races for political office or to 
secure approval or disapproval of referendum questions.” 
Electoral  violence has features that  make it  distinct  from other sorts  of political  violence. 
Firstly, it should be noted that such violence is utilized in order to realize specific political 
objective  ie.  to  affect  the  various  aspects  of  the  electoral  process  and  thus  its  outcomes 
(Høglund 2009: 415, FES 2001: 1).  Secondly,  it   may occur  at  all  stages of the electoral 
process. These are the pre-election period, the election day and the post-election period (Sisk 
2008: 14-16, IPI 2010: 20-21). Thirdly, it involves different actors like government forces ie. 
the police and military, political parties (leaders, members and sympathizers) and non-state 
armed groups like militias, rebels and paramilitaries (Laakso 2007: 228,UNDP 2009: 13). 
Fourthly,  it  includes  various  activities  such  as  threats,  coercion,  obstruction,  abduction, 
detention, assault, torture and murder as well as rioting, plundering and destroying properties, 
distracting  campaign  activities  and  materials,  disturbing  public  gathering  and  educational 
activities, shutting down offices, establishing ‘no-go’ areas ..etc (Marco 2009: 9,UNDP 2009:
20-22). Fifthly, it has specific targets. These include electoral partakers such as electorates, 
candidates, election officers, observers and media groups, electoral materials such as ballot 
boxes, campaign stuffs, registration data, polling results, electoral facilities such as voting and 
tallying stations and electoral events such as campaign meetings and demonstrations, journeys 
to voting stations (Høglund 2009: 417,USAID 2010: 5-6).  
Electoral violence has an effect both on democracy and peacebuilding.  From the standpoint of 
democratic  politics,  violence and insecurity may influence the result  of  elections  in  many 
ways. Actors may use threats and coercion to prevent electorates from registering to vote and 
to discourage them from casting votes. Party candidates may abandon the electoral process 
due to threats and killings during campaigns or may act against measures taken to conduct 
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elections (Høglund 2009: 417,419)(UNDP 2009: 5). From conflict management view point, 
violence may have an adverse effect on the society. It will polarize the voting public along 
conflict margins and in the worst case could lead to an outbreak of violent conflict. Radical or 
fanatic groups may also get the opportunity to assume state power through violence (ibid).  
3.2 Cause of Electoral Violence 
3.2.1 Nature  of  Politics
As Kristina Høglund (2009: 423)  suggested, the nature of politics in post conflict societies is 
one of the major areas from which the causal factors of electoral violence can be identified. 
Under  this  broader  topic,  I  will  discuss  the  enabling  conditions  and  triggering  factors  of 
electoral violence by further classifying them into three categories. These are patrimonial and 
neo patrimonial politics, conflict cleavages and cultures of violence and impunity.
 
3.2.1.1 Patrimonial and Neo patrimonial Politics
Predominant modes of authority do exist in several conflict, post conflict and newly democra-
tizing  countries.  Patrimonialism is  a  prevalent  phenomenon in  the  politics  of  many  post 
conflict  societies  (Høglund  2009:  420).  Besides  this,  Neo-patrimonialism  has  become  a 
peculiar  institutional attribute of  African political regimes (Bratton &Van de Walle 1994: 
458)(Erdmann &Engel 2007: 113). Under patrimonialism “the right to rule is ascribed to a 
person rather than an office” (Bratton & Van de Walle 1994: 458) and there is no distinction 
between public  and private  domain  (Erdmann & Engel  2007:  105).  All  sorts  of  authority 
relations  ie.  political  and  administrative  interactions  between  governor  and  governed,  are 
personal ones (ibid). In the case of neo patrimonialism, formal distinction between the public 
and the private sphere ie. official rules and structures, do exist in principle but it is difficult to 
observe these distinctions in practice (ibid) because “relationships of loyalty and dependence 
pervade the formal political and administrative system” (Bratton &Van de Walle 1994: 458). 
Hence, it combines two coinciding and partly intertwined forms of power ie. patrimonial and 
legal-rational  bureaucratic  authority  (Erdmann  &Engel  2007:  105)  and  characterizes  the 
power relations within  authoritarian  political regimes ( ibid: 113).
Clientelism and patronage are also considered as central parts of neopatrimonialism. Both of 
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them involve  securing  political  support  through  exchange  of  particular  public  goods  and 
services (ibid: 106). But differences exist with regard to the levels of relation and objects of 
exchange. Under clientelism, relations are personal ie. ‘patron -client relation’ and the client is 
expected  to  give  political  support  for  a  particular  patron  or  politician  in  order  to  secure 
personal benefits such as land, office …etc (ibid: 107). In the case of patronage, relations are 
more than personal ie. ‘high-level politics’ and the clients (groups) are  required to provide 
political support for a specific political party or a government in return for public utilities like 
roads, schools…etc (ibid). Politicians of clientelist regimes use vote buying  as well as ethno- 
regional appeals  as  instruments for securing political support (Van de Walle 2007: 63,66). In 
patronage democracies, electorates use their votes as a means of obtaining material rewards 
(Chandra 2007:  90).  As politicians favor their  co-ethnic  voters to secure political  support, 
voters will also favor their co-ethnic politicians to ensure those rewards (ibid: 103).
 
It is also asserted that both patrimonial and neo patrimonial politics have implications on the 
political stability of post-conflict and newly democratizing countries. Patrimonial politics has 
the potential to encourage electoral violence because it  marginalizes  significant portion of a 
society, gives more emphasis to loyalty than competence, promotes corruption and neglects 
the rule of law (Høglund 2009: 420).  Under neo patrimonial politics, insecurity exists with 
regard to the character and functions of government institutions due to three important reasons 
(Erdmann  &  Engel  2007:  105-6).  Firstly,  it  is  difficult  to  predict  the  activities  of  state 
agencies.  Secondly,  government  agencies may not  be able  to deliver basic  public  services 
properly.  Thirdly,  political  informality  may  encourage  expressing  institutional  informality 
openly which in turn leads to  a  different  kind of political  culture.  For  these reasons,  neo 
patrimonialism is considered as a source of social unrest (Bratton & Van de walle 1994: 460), 
as a cause for violent conflict (Mehler 2007: 217) and as a risk to peaceful political transitions 
( Erdmann &Engel 2007: 97).
3.2.1.2 Conflict  Cleavages.
The nature of actors participating in politics as well as existing cleavages within the society 
are  among  the  important  factors  which  determine  whether  elections  become  peaceful  or 
violent.  Cleavages  are  “ politically effective conflict  configurations institutionalized in the 
social structure.” (Eith & Mielke 2001: 11 quoted in Mehler 2007: 195). Experiences show 
that the capacity of post-conflict elections to bring about sustained peace and democracy is 
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determined by the extent to which politics is demilitarized (Lyons 2004: 273) and one of the 
important aspects of demilitarizing politics is the “ transformation of military organizations 
into effective political parties” (ibid: 277). However, in situations where previously warring 
parties have not yet been fully disarmed and demobilized, post conflict elections will have 
more  potential  to  incite  violent  conflict  (Lyons  2004:  283,  Høglund 2009:  420).  In  other 
words, the existence of armed groups facilitates the return to violence, if competing political 
parties reject the results of post conflict elections (Sisk 2009: 203,  Høglund 2009: 418,420). 
It is also argued that the manner in which political parties are organized and managed will 
determine whether elections lead to peaceful or violent outcomes. In post conflict societies, 
most political parties do not represent specific social classes and  are not recognized by their 
particular  policy of  public  interest  (Reilly 2008:  177-78,  Fortman 2000:  81).  Instead they 
manifest the social cleavages which instigated previous violent conflicts (Reilly 2008: 178). 
For instance, if previous wars were fought along ethnic lines, then ethnic-based  parties may 
flourish in the post war era (ibid). Such kinds of party formation stimulate stiff competition 
between the  ethnic  parties  on  the  one hand but  prevents  cooperative  relationships  among 
themselves and threatens the overall stability of the political arena on the other hand (ibid). In 
general, political parties in these societies are often fragmented and underdeveloped (Jarstad 
2008: 32, Sisk 2009: 201) and use violence to  promote narrow and extremist political ends 
(Mehler 2007: 200, Høglund 2009: 420).
In the case of Africa, it has been found that “ideological differences have been minor across 
parties,  and debates about specific policy issues have been virtually non-existent” (Van de 
walle  2007:  62)  because  political  parties  were  not  organized  on  the  basis  of  diverse 
perspectives on public demands and policies in the first place (Fortman 2000: 83). Rather they 
reflect and multiply existing ethnic cleavages (Mehler 2007: 212). Besides this, the expansion 
of a dominant party system in which  political power  is personalized has led to the narrowing 
down of political spaces available for fair political competition (Fortman 2000: 83, Mehler 
2007:  197).  The  logic  of  organizing  political  support  along ethnic  lines  also  exhibits  the 
“volatility of the party system, with the rapid appearance and disappearance of new parties 
around each election cycle” ( Van de walle 2007: 61). Moreover  due to the prevalence of 
ethnic  and  clientelist  politics,  it  is  very  difficult  for  program-based  political  parties  to 
effectively compete and secure significant  political support (Van de walle 2007: 67, Reilly 
2008: 178). Thus, opposition political parties may resort to violence as a way of expressing  
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grievances and a means of political struggle (Mehler 2007: 203-4, Laakso 2007: 227-28).
                                                                       
3.2.1.3 Cultures of  Violence and Impunity
Cultures of violence and impunity are among the major features of politics in conflict and post 
conflict societies. Culture of violence refers to ‘‘the system of norms, values or attitudes which 
allow, make possible or even stimulate the use of violence to resolve any conflict or relation 
with another person’’ (Cruz, in Moser& Winton 2002:11 quoted in  Steenkemp 2005: 254). 
Impunity refers to  the exemption of those who committed unlawful acts from accountability 
and legal punishment (Opotow 2003: 149). Under culture of impunity “government officials, 
the police and military, and ordinary citizens break the law without fear of punishment, for 
there is a shared understanding that each person will be silent about the other’s abuses as long 
as the favor is returned” (Crocker 1998:506 quoted in Opotow 2003: 150).  It   is strongly 
believed  that  culture  of  violence  is  an  outcome  or  a  legacy  of  past  violent  conflicts 
(SteenKemp 2005: 253, Høglund 2009: 421). Such culture prevails in societies that experience 
political violence for  prolonged periods and makes violent acts of state and non-state actors 
such  as  threats,  coercion  and  intimidation  acceptable  and  tolerable  at  societal  as  well  as 
individual  level  (ibid).  Other  than  this,  due  to  the  traumatic  experiences  of   past,  these 
societies have continued to live under fear and insecurity even after the end of such conflicts 
(Sisk 2009: 201, Jarstad 2008: 31). Therefore, conducting elections under such circumstances 
may not render the range of alternatives  required to advance democracy (Lyons 2004: 274) 
and makes political mobilization along conflict margins easier (Sisk 2009: 201, Jarstad 2008: 
31).  
There are major factors which contribute for the persistence of both cultures of violence and 
impunity in post conflict societies. One of these factors is the weakness of state institutions 
(Steenkamp 2005: 259, Høglund 2009:  421).  In these societies,  government institutions at 
national  and  local  level  are  mostly unaccountable,  non transparent,  politically partial,  and 
financially  unstable  (Jarstad  2008:  28)  and thus  fall  short  of  the  required  legitimacy and 
resources to manage widespread violence (Høglund 2008: 94). So when elections are held 
under such context, governments  usually fail to avoid fear and ensure security among their 
citizens (Sisk 2009: 201). Moreover, in societies where patronage politics is prevalent, security 
forces and judiciaries often encounter coercion and manipulation  from political elites which 
in turn hinders them from becoming efficient instrument for resolving conflicts ( Høglund 
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The other contributing factor for such culture is use of violence by state agents ( Steenkemp 
2005: 258, Hoglund 2009: 421). In these societies, the security  apparatus of the state such as 
the police and armed forces commit large scale human right violence at national level (ibid) 
and local officials also ensure the perpetuation of such violence at the lower levels (Høglund 
2008: 94). Such arbitrary and violent measures may also encourage sections of the society as 
well  as  non  state  armed  groups  to  continue  using  violence  as  a  viable  means  to  resolve 
conflicts  (Steenkemp 2005:  258)  and  may  hinder  ongoing  efforts  to  reconcile  existing 
cleavages within the society (Høglund 2008: 95). Other than this, political parties may also 
employ violence as a means of achieving various political objectives (Mehler 2007: 199). Due 
to fears of losing public support, political parties may also refrain from punishing the culprits 
of electoral violence (Høglund 2009: 421). In the case of Africa, ruling political parties use not 
only formal security forces but also party militias, criminal groups, and youth wings to carry 
out violence against opponents (ibid: 204).  The frequent use of violence by political parties in 
Africa thus, witnesses that it has become “a common mode of political competition in African 
societies, more common than consensus or cooperation.” (Mehler 2007: 208-9) and a major 
feature of electoral authoritarian regimes (Lindberg 2006: 157).
3.2.2 Nature of  Elections 
As Kristina Høglund (2009: 423)  indicated, the nature of elections in post conflict societies is 
the other important area from which the causal factors of electoral violence can be figured out. 
Within this broader topic, I will discuss the facilitating conditions and triggering factors of 
electoral  violence  by  further  categorizing  them  into  three  parts.  These  are  political 
mobilization, close competition and  stakes involved in such elections.   
3.2.2.1 Political  Mobilization   
Political  mobilization  causes  violent  conflict  in  post  war  societies.  In  these  societies, 
conducting competitive elections renders opportunities for generating conflict and violence 
through  increased  polarization  (Jarstad  2008:  29,  Høglund  2008:  85).  During  competitive 
elections, competing political  parties emphasize mainly on what makes them distinct from 
others  and  tend to mobilize political support along  lines of  differences (Jarstad 2008: 29). 
To be more specific,  in the course of  electoral campaign,  political elites and radical groups 
forward exclusive nationalistic and ethnic appeals to secure political support which further 
polarize the society and consequent outbreak of violent conflict (Reilly 2008: 178, Sisk 2009: 
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200). In other words, extreme nationalistic or ethnicized rhetoric worsens existing  tensions 
between political opponents and foment hatred among different ethnic groups (Reilly 2008: 
160, Sisk 2009: 200). Other than these, politicians also employ terminologies used for military 
purposes such as “strongholds”, “citadels”, “cadres”, “ strategies and tactics” and “ the parties 
wage  campaigns”  to  secure  wider  public  support  (Høglund  2008:  85,2009:  421).  Such 
activities  also  show the  extent  to  which  political  rights  are  used  for  wrong purposes  and 
competitive elections  intensify  prevailing  social and conflict cleavages ( Høglund 2008: 85). 
In  the  African  case,   it  is  strongly  believed  that  holding  multiparty  elections  aggravates 
prevailing  tensions  within  the  society  (Sisk  and  Reynolds  1998:  2)  and  heightens  the 
propensity  for  the  outbreak  of  violent  ethnic  conflict   (Sisk  1998:  150).  One  of  the 
justifications  forwarded  for  this  is  related  to  the  way parties  are  formed.  In  most  cases, 
political parties are mainly organized on the basis ethnic identity (Sisk 1998: 150, Fortman 
2000:  81).  The  other  reason  is  connected  to  the  way political  support  is  secured  during 
elections.  In several instances,  politicians  use ethnic identity as a viable means of mobilizing 
political support in times of elections (Glickman 1998: 37, Collier 2009: 26). More over there 
are  cases  where  political  parties  representing  diverse  ethno-  regional  interests  resorted  to 
violence, after realizing that they are losers of the electoral process and its outcome ( Mehler 
2007: 200, Bekoe 2008: 30).
3.2.2.2 Close Competition 
Closely competed  elections  cause  violence  in  conflict  ridden  societies.  In  these  societies, 
holding competitive elections renders incentives for generating  conflict and violence through 
increased contestation (Jarstad 2008: 29, Høglund 2008: 85). In other words electoral contests 
with close margins of victory create higher level of  uncertainty about the final outcome and 
eventually may lead to the outbreak of violence (Sisk 2008: 9, Høglund 2009: 421). On the 
one  hand,  dominant  groups  whose  political  power  is  threatened  by  democratic  political 
competition may resort to violence in order to secure their previous status (Jarstad 2008: 29-
30, Høglund 2008: 85-6). Since holding public office is considered as an important  means of 
exerting substantial influence to secure benefits from other spheres, politicians of electoral 
authoritarian regimes may resort towards stealing elections (Thompson & Kuntz 2006: 121). 
Other than this, fears of future legal prosecution in connection with alleged economic crimes 
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and  human  right  abuse  motivates  them  to  maintain  their  political  office  by  any  means 
(Thompson & Kuntz 2006: 117, Laakso 2007: 230). On the other hand, marginalized groups 
who gained less from the political competition than their expectations may opt for violence as 
a viable means to realize their new demands (Jarstad 2008: 29-30, Høglund 2008: 85-86). 
Specifically,  opposition  party  leaders  and  sympathizers  frustrated  by the  injustices  of  the 
electoral contest as well as other political forces  that were subjected to systematic exclusion 
from the political scene may consider violence as an alternative to achieve their political goals 
(Sisk 2008: 10).                                             
In the African context, political power is considered as a major social good because those who 
hold it, also have a significant control over a variety of other social goods ( Fortman 2000: 
76). So violence becomes inevitable, when elections pose a real probability for transforming 
the prevailing power configurations (Fortman 2000: 76, EISA 2010: 3). In Africa, both ruling 
and opposition political parties use violence ( Mehler 2007: 204). While, opposition groups 
employ violence to express their grievances over the electoral process or outcomes, ruling 
elites take arbitrary and suppressive measures against their political opponents due to deep-
seated fears of losing political power (Mehler 2007: 204, Laakso 2007: 230). Such problems 
become more prevalent in times of competitive multi-party elections and impede efforts to 
promote human right respect and entrench democratic governance in these societies ( Adivilah 
2009: 3-4).
3.2.2.3 Higher Stakes 
Competitive elections are more prone to conflict and violence in post conflict societies due to 
the  stakes involved in such elections (Høglund 2009: 422). The stakes of winning and losing a 
political office becomes extremely high within the contexts of patronage and identity politics 
(Sisk 2009: 9). The risk of election related violence is also high in situations where poverty 
and unemployment are rampant (Sisk 2009: 9, IDEA 2009: 10). Under patronage and identity 
politics,  those  who  hold  political  offices  enjoy  greater  control  over  various   economic 
resources and public services and distribute these resources and services to their  clients or co 
ethnics  in return for political  support  (  Sisk 2008:  9,  Chandra 2007:  87).  Thus for  ruling 
parties, political elites and their supporters, losing  political office via competitive election 
means losing their patronage network and jeopardizing the livelihood of themselves as well as 
of their supporters (Thompson & Kuntz 2006: 120, Sisk 2008: 9). For this reason,  they resort 
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to violence to avoid such threats and maintain their  statues quo (Sisk 2008: 9, Høglund 2009
:  422).  Besides  to  this,  in  situations  where  economic  underdevelopment  and  distributive 
injustices are prevalent,  a substantial section of the society holds grievances about lack of 
economic opportunities and absence of proper resource distribution (Sisk 2008: 9, Steenkemp 
2005: 260). Thus opposition parties, marginalized groups and their followers prevented from 
winning political posts via competitive elections may consider violent alternatives to assume 
state power and resolve longstanding grievances (Sisk 2008: 9, Jarstad 2008: 29-30).
In several  African countries,  due to the poor  performance  of their  economies,  the stakes 
involved in the politics have become very high (Fortman 2000: 76). Rampant poverty and 
economic strains have encouraged vulnerable sections of the society to organize grievance 
based violence in  election times (Laakso 2007: 229, Fortman 2000:  92).  Elected office is 
mostly  considered  by  politicians  as  a  place  which  provides  opportunities  to  engage  in 
economic crimes and ‘immunity from prosecution ’(Collier 2009: 27). Recent studies have 
also  identified  grievances  over  land  rights,  economic  discrimination  and  ethnic 
marginalization  as  important  factors  facilitating election related  violence  in  Africa (Bekoe 
2010: 2, Souare 2008: 8).
3.2.3 Electoral Institutions  
As Kristina  Høglund  (2009:  423)  put  forward,  the  nature  of  electoral  institutions  in  post 
conflict  societies  is  also  another  central  area  from  which  the  causal  factors  of  electoral 
violence can be distinguished. In this wider topic, I will discuss the enabling conditions and 
triggering factors of electoral violence by further categorizing them into three areas. These are 
electoral systems, electoral rules and regulations and election administration. 
3.2.3.1 Electoral Systems 
Electoral  system choice  has  an  impact  on  conflict  dynamics  in  post  conflict  and  fragile 
societies. In these societies, the choice of such systems may facilitate conditions favorable for 
election related violence (Høglund 2009: 422, Sisk 2008: 11). Converting the votes cast into 
parliamentary seats  in  different  manners  is  among the main tasks  of  any electoral  system 
(Reynolds&Sisk 1998: 19, Reilly&Reynolds 2000: 425). Another key role is to serve as a 
channel through which voters make their representatives accountable (ibid).  Other than these, 
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it  arranges  the  limits  of  “acceptable”  political  dialogue  and offers  incentives  for  political 
parties to express their appeals to voters in various ways (ibid). Therefore electoral systems “ 
reflect negotiated settlements of political  conflicts  over institutional design” and “structure 
political conflicts over distributional outcome.” (Mozaffar 1998: 81) . 
Electoral systems can be classified into three major categories.  These are plurality-majority, 
proportional representation (PR), and semi proportional (Reilly 2008: 172).  Plural majority is 
a system where a candidate or a party with a majority vote becomes winner and takes decision 
making power on behalf of the entire public (Sisk 2009: 202, McGee 2008: 5). This system 
applies  small  and single-member electoral  districts  and provides more importance to  local 
representation (Reilly 2008: 173). The first-past-the-post, round off, block and alternative vote 
are subtypes of  this winner -takes-all-system (ibid). Generally, the system is considered to 
provide clear-cut choices and discard extremism (Reynolds& Sisk 1998: 23).  Proportional  
representation is a system where candidates compete for a prearranged number of seats and 
political parties share the total votes cast and decision making powers equivalently (Sisk 2009: 
202, McGee 2008: 5). This system uses larger and multi-member districts and  gives more 
emphasis to proportional representation ( Reilly 2008: 173). The open and closed party list PR, 
mixed member and single transferable vote are subtypes of the proportional system (ibid).  In 
general,  the system is considered to ensure more representation and inclusiveness than the 
plural-majority ones (Reynolds&Sisk 1998: 25). Semi proportional system is a system which 
integrate components of both plurality-majority and proportional systems (Reilly 2008: 173, 
McGee 2008: 6). When applied, it creates a parliament in which part of the elected members 
come from electoral districts that used PR (proportional representation) and part from that 
used PM (plural majority) (Reilly 2008: 173).  Such mixed systems are designed  with the aim 
of  bringing a more legitimate and inclusive election outcome and power distribution and thus 
as a remedy for the pitfalls of the other two mentioned systems ( McGee 2008: 6). 
It is also suggested that deciding an appropriate electoral system for both ethnically alike and 
divided societies, requires making compromises amongst  different and contending normative 
ends. These are representativeness, accountability, inclusiveness & accessibility, stability of 
government,  development  of  the  party  system  and  ability  to  engender  reconciliation 
(Reynolds&Sisk  1998:  21-22)  Therefore,  electoral  systems  designed  without  adequate 
consideration of these ends often become ineffective instruments for promoting democracy 
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and  mitigation  conflicts  (Reynolds  &Sisk  1998:  21,  Mozaffar  1998:  84,91).   Moreover, 
specific  contextual  factors  such  as  the  historical  process  that  brought  about  the  electoral 
systems, the nature of existing societal cleavages and the nature of present political system, 
require  greater  importance  while  evaluating  the  applicability  of  any  electoral  system for 
divided  societies  (Reilly& Reynolds  2000:  429)  and its  effect  on  conflict  dynamics  (Sisk 
2008: 13).  For instance, electoral systems deliberately chosen by powerful groups in post-war 
transitional periods (eg. constitution making or peace process) in order to maximize political 
benefits  poses serious questions  regarding  the legitimacy of the system  and hinders the 
democratic  progress  and  political  stability  of  these  societies  in  the  long-run  (Reilly  & 
Reynolds 2000: 442, Sisk 2008: 13).  Besides this, the degree to which ethnicity is associated 
with the support  given to political  parties  and the  behavior of the voting public usually 
determines the capacity of different electoral systems to either dispel or limit ethnic conflicts 
(Reilly  and  Reynolds  2000:  429).   Moreover,  introducing  “  winner  -take-  all  ”  (simple 
majority)  electoral  systems  under  contexts  where  ethnic  based  political  parties  are 
predominant  and the political  arena is  less tolerant of opposing views,  contributes  to the 
persistence of exclusionary and zero-sum politics. ( Reilly & Reynolds 2000: 435, Reynolds & 
Sisk 1998: 24).  In the case of Africa where neo patrimonial politics is prominent, plural-
majority systems performed  much less in terms of ensuring  representation, accountability, 
inclusiveness,  party  development  and  political  stability  than  proportional  representation 
systems (Lindberg 2005: 61-62). Therefore,  the use of an electoral system that facilitates a 
“zero-sum game” makes the risk of electoral conflict and violence high in the continent (EISA 
2010: 4).
3.2.3.2  Election  Administration
Election administration has a role in terms of inducing violence in post conflict societies. In 
these  societies,  such  administration  might  create  favorable  circumstances  for  electoral 
violence (Høglund 2008: 422, Sisk 2008: 16). In principle, the ways of structure, levels of 
competence  and  extents  of  balance  of  any  electoral  institution  determine  its  capacity  to 
administer  credible  elections  (Sisk  2008:  16).  Specifically  the  efficiency,  professionalism, 
transparency,  impartiality  and  independence  are  important  preconditions  to  come  up with 
legitimate election outcomes (Lyons 2004: 282 & Sisk 1998: 169). In contexts where these 
prerequisites are  not  operationalized,  the risk of political  instability and electoral  violence 
becomes high (Pastor 1999: 5 & Sisk 2008: 16 ). Practically, elections are conducted under 
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circumstances  of  mistrust  and  suspicion  in  many  post-conflict  and  newly  democratizing 
countries (Lyons 2004: 282, Mansfield& Snyder 2007: 171). The prevalence of political bias, 
the  absence  of  accountability  and  lack  of  adequate  finances  within  public  institutions  in 
general (Jarstad 2008: 28) and the lack of impartiality, independence and competence on the 
part of election administration institutions in particular (Pastor 1999: 12) play an important 
role in creating such circumstances. 
Moreover, choices made over the nature of  electoral management bodies are instrumental in 
facilitating the conditions for election related violence (Høglund 2009: 422). Basically, such 
bodies can  be organized on the basis of  both  partial- partisan and independent-non partisan 
models of electoral administration (Lopez-Pintor 2005: 22, Pastor 1999: 12). For instance, an 
election  administration  office within the  government  and an election administration office 
within a government ministry but supervised by a judicial body can be considered as partial- 
partisan  models  of  election  administration  in  transitional  elections  (Pastor  1999:  12).  An 
independent election commission staffed by experts and directly accountable to the parliament 
and a multiparty election commission composed of representatives of the political parties can 
be considered as independent-non partisan models of election administration in such elections 
(ibid).  Evidences  indicate  that,  high  level  of  mistrust  and  divisions  among political  party 
representatives have become commonplace in countries that adopted partial- partisan electoral 
management  entities  (Reilly  2008:  176).  In  many  developing  countries,  these  electoral 
management  bodies  lack  the  required  impartiality,  independence  and  competence  (Pastor 
1999:  12).  In  the  case  of  Africa,  similar  problems  posed  serious  questions  on  the  very 
credibility of elections and subsequently heightened the risk of electoral  violence (Mehler 
2007: 210, EISA 2010: 4). To overcome such problems therefore, the significance of adopting 
independent and professional administrative bodies is stressed by many (Lopez-Pintor 2005: 
21, Reilly 2008: 175).
The monitoring of elections by  missions designated for such purpose is  another essential 
activity related to electoral management (Høglund 2009: 423). The main objective of election 
monitoring is building the confidence of the voting public on the overall electoral process 
(Sisk  1998:  170,  Lopez-Pintor  2005:  25).  This  involves  evaluating  the  extent  to  which 
elections were conducted in a free and fair manner (Sisk 2009: 204, Ndulo 2010: 169) and 
verifying manipulative and violent activities that may influence the electoral process and its 
outcome (Sisk 1998: 170, Fortman 2000: 92). Even though the presence of domestic and 
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international election monitoring  organizations may not necessary avert the risk of electoral 
violence, it may reduce the magnitude of such violence (Høglund 2009: 423).
3.2.3.3  Electoral Rules and Regulations   
Both formal and informal rules of electoral game play a part  in generating conflict in post 
conflict  and  newly  democratizing  societies.  In  these  societies,  such  rules   can  facilitate 
conditions conducive for electoral conflict and violence (Høglund 2008: 421, Sisk 1998: 4). 
In principle, these rules are broadly classified  into rules of electoral competition and rules of 
electoral  governance  (Mozzafar  and  Schedler  2002:  7-8).  Rules  of  electoral  competition 
consists of issues such as electoral formulas, district magnitude and boundaries, assembly size 
…etc (ibid) and are mostly referred in many writings as electoral systems. Rules of electoral 
governance  cover  areas  like  party,  candidate and voter eligibility and registration, vote 
counting,  tabulating  and  reporting  techniques,  election  monitoring  and  conflict  resolution 
mechanisms, campaign financing …etc (ibid).  These rules offer structural  inducements for 
modest  and  conflict-resolving  character  on  the  part  of  those  playing  the  political  game 
(Reynolds&Sisk 1998: 4). For instance, an electoral code of conduct obliges political parties 
to respect the political rights and  freedoms of others and  ensure the freeness and fairness of 
the  elections  (Ndulo  2010:  168).  Nonetheless,  studies  indicate  that  electoral  authoritarian 
regimes of many newly democratizing countries adopt and practice different sets of informal 
rules that make electoral competition undemocratic (Schedler 2006: 3). Similar rules are also 
used by hybrid (semi-authoritarian) regimes in several post-conflict societies (Wigell 2008
:  242)  and the  risk of  political  instability  and violence  have  become extreme under  such 
regimes (Østerud 2008: 233). Moreover, these rules were given different labels by various 
scholars like “Nested Games” by Andreas Schedler (2006: 12), “Norm Violations” by Mikael 
Wigell (2008: 242) and  “Winning Strategies” by Paul Collier (2009: 45)  and  seem to be 
conflict-inducing  in their very essence.  
One of the strategic rules used by such regimes is  imposing different kinds of  restrictions on 
the political rights and civil liberties of citizens (Schedler 2006: 3, Wigell 2008: 13). This 
includes measures taken by the government to control the state as well as private electronic 
and print media (Ottaway 2003: 152, Case 2006: 99) and restrict the rights of different social 
and political organizations to assemble for their own cause (Ottaway 2003: 149, Case 2006: 
99). The other strategy is preserving key political domains and positions away from electoral 
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competition (Schedler 2006: 3,Wigell 2008: 13). Such positions render the incumbent party 
the power to amend constitutions and adopt legislations for their own benefit (Ottaway 2003: 
155-6, Case 2006: 101) and  allows them to maintain their control over existing patronage 
resources and hierarchies (Case 2006: 101, Ghandi 2009: 408). Another important strategy is 
excluding  political  opponents  from  the  electoral  game  and  fragmenting  their  overall 
organization (Schedler 2006: 3, Wigell 2008: 13). Such  rulings aim at limiting  the extent of 
choice  available  for  the  voting  public  during  election  and  may  involve  activities  like 
deregistering opposition parties and disenfranchising political candidates (Case 2006: 101). A 
substantial   percentage  of  the  public  which  sympathize  opposition  parties  can  also  be 
systematically marginalized from the voter registration process (Ottaway 2003: 141).
These regimes also consider vote buying as a vital strategy to win electoral competition (Case 
2006: 103,Wigell 2008: 242). This strategy involves distributing public goods and services at 
personal  and  community  level  through  channels  of  patronage  (Ghandi  2009:  408-9)  and 
dispensing money to individual  as well as  group voters through networks of  corruption 
(Collier 2009: 31). Consequently, voters are expected and obliged to render political support in 
return to the rewards they received from politicians of the incumbent party (Collier 2009: 
31,Ghandi 2009: 413). Intimidation can also be prioritized by such regimes as a more reliable 
strategy of  securing political  support  (Case 2006:  104,  Wigell  2008:  242).  As part  of  the 
overall  politically motivated violence,  agents  of  the  ruling  party  may  apply threats  and 
coercion on political  opponents and the voting public (Lindberg 2006: 157). These tactics 
might also be considered by state agents as  counter measures against  possible violence from 
the opposition side (Collier 2009: 34). Another  key  strategic choice  made by  these regimes 
is electoral fraud (Case 2006: 104, Wigell 2008: 242). The main objective of electoral fraud is 
to affect electoral outcomes and its scope extends from technical infringement of the electoral 
laws to outright employment of violence against voters (Lehoucq 2003: 233). Specifically, 
such violence may target registration data, campaign materials, ballot boxes, vote results as 
well as the voters themselves (Høglund 2009: 417). Recent studies have also indicated that all 
the above strategies were widely used  by several  African  regimes (Lindberg 2006: 156-7, 
Collier 2009: 38-9). 
In this chapter,  I have presented the theoretical framework of electoral violence. Firstly, I 
have described briefly the meaning,  nature,  effects  of electoral  violence.  Secondly,  I  have 
forwarded the explanations concerning how electoral violence is caused. The major causes for 
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such  violence  are  related  to   the  nature  of  politics,  the  nature  of  elections  and  electoral 
institutions. Topics such as patrimonial and neo-patrimonial politics, conflict cleavages and 
cultures of violence and impunity  are discussed under  the nature of politics.  Issues like 
political mobilization, close competition and stakes involved  are covered  within the nature of 
elections.  Subjects  such  as  electoral  systems,  rules  of  electoral  conduct  and  election 
administration are analyzed under electoral institutions.                                                            
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         Chapter Four : Causes of the 2005  Electoral Violence in  Ethiopia 
Analyzing the causes of a particular phenonmenon requires considering various contextual 
factors. Thus, the main purpose of this chapter is to make a broader analysis  on the causes of 
the  2005 electoral  violence  in  Ethiopia.  Specifically,  the  empirical  fact  on  the  May 2005 
national election will be presented by classifying it into pre-election period, election day and 
post-election period.  Moreover, the causes of the 2005 electoral violence will be analyzed in 
light of the theoretical frame of electoral violence, the empirical fact on the May 2005 national 
election and my own reflections.
4.1  The  May 2005 Election of  Ethiopia in Retrospect  
4.1.1  Pre- Election Period 
        
4.1.1.1 Political Context
Ethiopia is a federal republic comprising of nine administrative regions and two self governing 
cities (EuEom 2005: 7). The nine regions are Tigray, Amhara, Oromo, Afar, Harari, Somali. 
Benishangul\  Gumuz, Gambela and state of the southern nations, nationalities and peoples 
(SNNPS) and the two self-governing cities are Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa (ibid). Institutions 
both at the federal and state level are entitled to exercise legislative, executive and judicial 
powers (ibid). The parliament is bicameral ie. comprised of two chambers (Carter 2009: 10). 
These are the upper chamber,  the House of Federation  and the lower chamber, House of 
Peoples’ Representatives (ibid). While the former has 108 seats, the latter has  547 seats (ibid). 
While  members of  the House of Federation are elected by regional assemblies and serve five-
year terms, members of the House of Peoples’ Representatives are elected by popular vote 
from single-member constituencies  and  serve five-year terms (ibid). 
4.1.1.2 Legal Framework 
    
The 1994 constitution, the 1995 election law, which was amended before the 2005 elections, 
and regulation no.1 issued by the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) are the major 
legal instruments governing the holding of elections (EuEom 2005: 8). Basic political rights 
such as the rights of freedom of expression, association, assembly and movement as well as 
rights to vote and to be elected are enshrined  the Constitution (AU Eot 2005: 7). Simple 
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majority rule “first past the post” is stipulated as the electoral system governing  elections for 
the 547 seats of the lower legislative chamber ie. House of Peoples’ Representatives (EuEom 
2005: 9). The 1957 penal code has listed electoral offenses such as impersonation, disturbance 
of meetings or assemblies, breach of the secrecy of voting, falsification of results and breaches 
of official secrecy (Carter 2009: 10). The electoral law states that election can be observed by 
“  political  organizations  campaigning for  the election,  the public,  various  forms of  public 
organizations” and the government can also invite international observers (EuEom 2005: 10). 
It also provides that  any citizen who is 18 or older  is eligible for registration  as a voter and 
should have resided in the constituency in question for six months or more (AU Eot 2005: 7). 
As per the 2005 modifications to  the 1995 electoral  law,  Woredas ie.  administrative units 
monitored  by  the  local  government,  are  the  basis  for  the  constituencies  accountable  for 
electing a representative to the parliament and  are further partitioned into kebelles, which are 
the smallest  administrative units in Ethiopia (Carter 2009: 10). The formal legal complaints 
mechanism according to the 1995 electoral law provides that complaints should first be lodged 
with the woreda election officer (ibid). If the complaints are concerning  elector registration 
and  voting,  the  woreda  court  will  make  the  final  decision  (ibid).  Complaints  regarding 
candidate registration can be appealed to the Regional Supreme Court, and complaints with 
regard to tabulation  can be appealed  to Federal High Court via the NEBE (ibid). 
4.1.1.3 Election Campaign
Compared  to  previous  elections,  there  was  a  significantly  expanded  freedom for  political 
campaigning and this encouraged political parties to campaign actively country wide (Eu Eom 
2005: 15). Both the opposition and the ruling parties organized peaceful party rallies in Addis 
Ababa which also demonstrated the public interest in the democratic process in general and in 
the elections in particular ( Carter 2009: 15). The joint political party forum organized by the 
NEBE at national and constituency level also played a role in resolving campaign related 
problems (EuEom 2005: 16). However problems of using state institutions and resources for 
campaign purpose by the ruling parties were widely reported and this showed the existing 
overlap in the functions of government at the regional and zonal levels and the EPRDF party 
(Carter 2005: 16). Despite improved campaign context, opposition parties reported various 
instances of harassment, intimidation detentions and other electoral offences (ibid). Members 
of the  ruling party have also accused the opposition party members of violating campaign 
rules by  campaigning in churches, schools  and market places (ibid: 15). Inflammatory 
                                                                      39
rhetoric was also used by the contending parties towards the end of the campaigning period 
(EuEom 2005: 16). For instance the deputy prime minister used an extreme rhetoric during 
one public debate forum by comparing the opposition parties with the  interhamwe militia 
which  was responsible for the 1994 Rwandan genocide (ibid).
4.1.1.4 Media 
In Ethiopia, both the audio and the print media  is dominated by the state (EuEom 2005: 17). 
The  government   monitors   the  only  TV  station  (Ethiopia  TV),  a  radio  station  (Radio 
Ethiopia), a national news agency (Ethiopia News Agency, ENA)(EuEom 2005: 17). It also 
manages the three out of the four daily newspapers (Addis Zemen, the Ethiopian Herald and 
Baarisa) (ibid). Furthermore, the ruling party is strongly affiliated with the only other news 
agency (Walta  Information  Center)  and  a  radio  station  with  countrywide coverage  (Radio 
Fana)(ibid). The Reporter, which has two weekly editions in English and one in Amharic, and 
the  Addis Admas,  published in Amharic were the two most important representatives of the 
private press (ibid). Generally, the election campaign  period was more passionately covered 
by the private press than the state media (ibid). Unparalleled opening of the state media was 
also witnessed during the campaign period ( EuEom 2005: 16). The government allocated 
free airtime and space  to contending  political parties (ibid). While 44% was allocated for the 
ruling party, opposition parties gained 56% (Nordem 2005: 9).  The free exchange of political 
views via the state media contributed a lot in raising the public political awareness and interest 
in the electoral process (EuEom 2005: 17). 
However, after election day, the government made a drastic change on its policy on the use of 
public media (EuEom 2005: 16). Consequently state media  stopped  providing access for 
opposition opinions and covered only government/EPRDF stands (ibid).  Another issue which 
raised serious concerns was the passing of  the restrictive draft  press law as an amendment  to 
the new Penal Code (ibid: 17). From a procedural view, the law was adopted without proper 
consultation of the concerned parties and violates the rights of citizens to participate in public 
affairs under Art. 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)(ibid: 
10). In  terms  of  substance,  the  law  provides  that  anyone  in  the  media  production  and 
distribution chain can become criminally responsible if the author or editor of an article cannot 
be distinguished (ibid). Therefore the passing of this law might have had an intimidating effect 
on the operation of the private press (media)(ibid). 
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4.1.2 Voting 
Despite some exceptions, the election day (15th of May) was generally peaceful and orderly 
(Nordem 2005: 9). Around 96% of the polling stations observed by the EU were opened on the 
scheduled timeframe (EuEom 2005:  18).  There was also a  very high voter  turnout  which 
resulted in long queues (Nordem 2005: 9). More than 20 million people went to cast their vote 
on this day (Carter 2009:20). Voting hours were extended in many areas in order to overcome 
the  long queues  (Carter  2009:  20).  Despite  the  delivery of  voting  material  was  generally 
sufficient in the country side, there were scarcities in some areas  because of the huge voter 
turnout (EuEom 2005 : 19).  Election officials as well as community observers were generally 
present in the 93% of  the voting stations visited by EU observers (EuEom 2005: 18). With 
regard to political  party observers, EPRDF party observers were present in the 93 % of the 
voting stations visited by EU whereas CUD party observers were present in the  73% of the 
polling stations visited and UEDF party observers were present in the 40 % of the EU visited 
stations (ibid). Other parties observers and individual candidates observers were present in the 
25 and 23 percent  of voting stations visited by EU respectively (ibid). Non-partisan domestic 
observers were present in 47 per cent of polling stations visited by the EU (ibid). In general, 
the electoral process was judged by EU election observers as “very good” and “good” in the 
77 percent , “poor” in the 17 %  and totally unsatisfactory  in  the 5 percent of the visited 
voting stations during the election day (ibid).
4.1.3 Post- Election  Period
 
4.1.3.1 Election Administration 
The main body responsible for the administration of elections at national, regional and local 
level is the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE)( Eu Eom 2005: 13).  The NEBE is 
composed of seven members elected by the House of Peoples’ Representatives  and members 
are obliged to have no political affiliation and to be selected on the merit basis (Carter 2009: 
13).  The Board   has  the power to  issue regulations  and directives  and is  accountable  for 
assigning  and training electoral officials ( EuEom 2005: 13). It also has the responsibility to 
deliver civic education to the public, notify official results, investigate complaints and resolve 
electoral irregularities (ibid). At the federal level, this election management body  is staffed 
with 170 permanent officials and out of this 12 are regional electoral  coordinators for the 
various regions (Eu Eom 2005: 14). In times of elections, more than 120,000 election officers 
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are recruited by constituency electoral offices to administer polling stations (ibid). In each of 
the 547 constituencies for the lower chamber legislature, constituency electoral committees 
composed of three seconded civil  servants  are  formed during elections  (Carter  2009:  13). 
Moreover  in  each  of  the  more  than  33,000  polling  stations,  polling  station  committees 
composed of five persons mostly civil servants are organized (ibid). Other than these, polling 
stations  also  involve  a  three  member  Grievance  and  Complaint  Committee,  led  by  the 
Chairman  of  the  Polling  Station  Committee,  five  election  observers  selected  by the  local 
public, and up to two observer  delegates  per candidate (Carter 2009: 13).
The overall performance of the NEBE was mixed (EuEom 2005: 14). Generally, the NEBE 
managed the electoral process effectively up to election day.  Election officers at all levels 
demonstrated  higher  dedication  and  worked  their  best  in  general  (ibid).  Given  the 
geographical  distances,  infrastructural  problems  and scarcity  of  electoral  finance,  the  pre-
election preparations such as voter and candidate registration were generally well organized 
and more transparent than before (ibid). In order to come up with consultative solutions for 
potential  election related problems, the NEBE also organized the so called  joint  political 
parties forum   which was also a positive development (ibid). This forum was organized both 
at national and constituency levels and  allowed political parties to jointly discuss problems 
related to election campaign and election administration (ibid: 16). For instance, competing 
political parties signed a code of conduct in this context (ibid). Other than this, the ruling party 
(EPRDF), CUD and other opposition parties  signed a  joint non-violence pact  shortly before 
the election day (ibid). 
However, after the election day the NEBE contributed to the substantial delays in the counting 
of votes and aggregation of results (ibid:14). Besides Some decisions made by the NEBE have 
raised questions and resulted in  the opposition’s allegations  of the NEBE impartiality (ibid). 
Due to lack of voter education and inadequate training of election officials, a large number of 
invalid votes were observed in several   areas (ibid). The NEBE decision to restrict several 
civil society organization from observing the election also raised serious concerns (ibid: 15). 
The NEBE decided  that to observe the elections, the statutes of  these organizations should 
consider  election  observation  as  an  important  organizations  objective  (ibid).  Although the 
decision of the NEBE was later on turned down by the federal high as well as supreme court, 
lateness  of  the  court  decisions  made  these  organization  unable  to  observe  the  elections 
effectively (ibid). Another main concern was that opposition political parties mistrusted the 
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NEBE from the very beginning (EuEom 2005: 15). Such  lack of  confidence on the NEBE 
emanated from the very practice of appointing of an electoral commission by the one party 
dominated federal parliament (ibid).
4.1.3.2 Counting and Tabulation 
Despite the absence of major incidents on the election day, significant problems started to 
appear   during  the  vote  counting  and  tabulation  stage  (Carter  2009:  22).  In  several. 
constituencies the process of counting  and the publication of results both at local and national 
level  was defective and slow (EuEom 2005: 19).  In almost  half  the urban voting stations 
monitored by EU, the counting and closing  process in general is accessed negatively (37 per 
cent poor and 10 per cent totally unsatisfactory) and the figure gets even worse for rural areas 
(ibid). Insufficient training, adverse material conditions and bureaucratic procedures were also 
among reasons behind the slowness the vote counting at  polling stations and constituency 
level.(ibid:  19-20).  Several  irregularities  including ballot  box stuffing and unlocked ballot 
boxes  and  being  prohibited  from  accessing  many  tabulation  centers  were  reported  by 
opposition  parties  and  confirmed  by  observers  (Carter  2009:  22).  Intimidation  of  party 
supporters and candidates as well as the presence of militia were also reported by opposition 
parties (EU Eom 2005: 21). Claims and counter claims of winning the majority seat by the 
ruling as well as opposition political parties also overshadowed the counting and aggregation 
process (ibid).  The opposition and ruling parties together filed around 383 election complaints 
to the NEBE with the potential to affect the results of 299 constituencies (Carter 2009: 23). 
The NEBE inability to ensure transparency in the counting and tabulation process also raised 
serious questions about the credibility of  the final results (ibid: 22). The NEBE published the 
preliminary results of 513 constituencies by early June 2005 and postponed the publication of 
final election result after the finalization  of the complaint investigation process (EuEom 2005: 
21).  The  results  showed  that  the  EPRDF  achieved   clear  majority   and   this  made  the 
oppositions to continue to strongly dispute the result by claiming massive electoral fraud and 
led to the violence which occurred in June,2005 (Carter 2009: 23)16. 
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16 According to the final election result issued by the NEBE on september 5, 2005, EPRDF won 327 seats (55% 
of votes), CUD won 109 seats (26% of votes), UEDF won 52 seats (9% of votes) and others won 57 seats 
(10% of votes). (Source; Final Report of the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia on the May 2005 Election).
4.1.3.3 Complaints Investigation Process
To resolve disputes over  election results,  the government and opposition parties agreed to 
establish  an  ad  hoc  complaints  review  and  investigation  mechanisms  (Carter  2009:  25). 
Consequently, the NEBE established two Complaints Review Boards (CRB 1&CRB 2) and 44 
Complaints  Investigation  Panels  (CIPs)  to  verify   complaints  and  conduct  investigations, 
respectively, within a period of two-month (ibid). Both the CRBs and CIPs were composed of 
three  members,  one  from the  NEBE,  one  from the  complainant  party  and  one  from the 
defendant party (Eu Eom 2005: 25,28). The Complaints Review Body (CRB 1) reviewed the 
whole body of the complaints and then decided the complaints with significant evidence to be 
reviewed  by  Complaints  Investigation  Panels  (CIPs)  (ibid).  To  provide  an  administrative 
appeal to complaints, the second complaints review body (CRB2) was also established (Eu 
Eom 2005: 25,28). After investigating the complaints, the Complaints Investigation Panels 
(CIPs) forwarded recommendations to the NEBE and when parties were unsatisfied with the 
NEBE action, they were allowed to appeal to the court system (ibid).  Initially,  the CRB1 
filed more than 383 complaints and out of this 151 were chosen to be investigated by 26 
different  CIP panels  (ibid).  From the  151 complaints  reviewed,  10  percent  were  filed  by 
EPRDF, 27 percent by UEDF and 53 percent by CUD (ibid). The CRB2  reviewed the 232 
complaints rejected by the CRB1 and out of this 9 percent were filed by EPRDF, 29 percent by 
the CUD and 41 percent by the UEDF (ibid). The CRB2 also reviewed 29 other complaints 
rejected  by CRB1 due to lack of  sufficient evidence (ibid) and to investigate the complaints 
forwarded by the CRB2 , the NEBE created 18 additional CIPs (ibid).  
The complaint investigation process led to decision made by the NEBE to conduct re-run 
elections in 31 constituencies  in the Amhara, Oromia and SNNP regions (EuEom 2005: 29). 
Despite the fact that  26 of the 31 constituency re run elections were the outcomes of the 
complaints made by the opposition, all the 31 seats were won by the ruling party during the 
August 2005 re-run elections (Carter 2009: 31).  The complaint reviewing process however, 
could not become an effective mechanism to investigate complaints because it was conducted 
in the context of partial arbitration and human right abuse (Eu Eom 2005: 28). The NEBE`s 
alignment with the ruling party during  decision making in the CIPs made the opposition 
parties such as the CUD to withdraw from the process and made the ruling party to stand 
unchallenged for re-voting (Carter 2009: 31). Compared with the ruling party lawyers, the 
opposition side lacked the necessary expertise and resources for making sound presentations at 
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the  panels  (Carter  2009:  31).  Inconsistencies  in  terms  of  the  application  of  the  various 
electoral  rules  and regulations also posed serious problems on the complaint  investigation 
process (ibid). Opposition leaders and supporters were also threatened in several ways while 
the  complaint  investigation  was  undergoing  in  their  local  area  and  this  undermined  the 
capacity of the opposition to effectively participate in the process (EuEom 2005: 28). There 
are  instances  where  important  witnesses  declined  from  testifying  due  to  fear  of  the 
consequence (ibid). There was also the presence  police, militia and armed forces  in areas 
where  the complaint process took place (ibid).
 
4.1.3.4 Human Right Issues 
On the evening of the election day ie. May 14th,2005, the prime minister  declared a  state of 
emergency  and notified a ban on any sort of demonstration in Addis Ababa  (Eu Eom 2005: 
22).  In  contrast  to  the  pre-  election  period,  the  media  coverage  became  unbalanced  and 
reflected only government\ EPRDF stands (ibid). Due to biased reporting, the accreditation of 
five  local  correspondents  of  international  media  was  also  withdrawn  by  the  ministry  of 
information (ibid:23). Students of Addis Ababa university rioted on June 5 and the riot spread 
to other parts of the city (ibid). On the next day police arrested 520 students and other 50 
residents (ibid).  Demonstration took place in Addis Ababa on June 8 and on this day the 
police and armed forces killed around 36 people and wounded several others (ibid). The main 
reasons for the early June violence were the frustration of CUD supporters over the delay in 
the counting of votes and publication of final results (Writenet 2006: 15) and the claims  on 
the part of CUD of electoral fraud and NEBE`s partiality towards EPRDF (Amnesty 2006: 3). 
Consequently a wave of arrests were conducted in connection with the demonstration and the 
numbers of arrested people were estimated to be in thousands (Eu Eom 2005: 23). Elected 
opposition leaders such as those of CUD were harassed and forced to be under house arrest 
without court warrant (ibid). Security forces also raided the offices of  opposition parties and 
arrested their staff members (ibid). Members  of human right advocacy organizations such as 
the Ethiopian Human Rights council as well as journalists from the private media such as 
Ethiop, Menelik  and Nesanet  were also arbitrarily arrested (ibid). A new parliamentary law 
which  restricts  the  role  of  opposition  parties  in  the  parliament  was  also  adopted  by  the 
outgoing  ruling  party  dominated  parliament  ie.  House  of  Peoples  Representatives  (Carter 
2009: 38). Several elected opposition members and leaders refused to assume their new seats 
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parliament which was reconvened in October 2005 (Carter 2009: 38). In response to this, the 
government  denied  the  elected  CUD  members  and  leaders  of  their  legal  immunity  from 
criminal prosecution (ibid).  Opposition groups  call  for a government of national unity was 
rejected by the government (ibid). Consequently violence erupted for the second time in early 
November  2005  and  in  this  violence  more  than  40  peoples  were  killed,  hundreds  were 
wounded  and  several  thousands  were  imprisoned  (ibid).  The  main  reasons  for  the  early 
November violence were the continued claim on the part of the CUD of massive electoral 
fraud (Writenet 2006: 16) and its call for a nation wide popular strike and civic disobedience 
(Amnesty 2006: 4) This time, hundreds of opposition political leaders and members of the 
civil society were also incarcerated with treason and genocide charges (Carter 2009: 38). 
                                                                    
4.2  Causes of the 2005 Electoral  Violence in Ethiopia 
4.2.1 Nature of Politics in Contemporary Ethiopia
4.2.1.1 Neo Patrimonial and Authoritarian Politics
Neo-patrimonialism has  become a peculiar institutional attribute of African political regimes 
(Bratton & Van de walle 1994: 458). Recent studies have also identified the regime in power 
in Ethiopia as a neo-patrimonial ones (Abbink 2005: 193). It is argued that, in such regimes 
despite the existence of formal distinctions between the public and the private sphere, it is 
difficult  to  observe  these  distinctions  in  practice”  (Erdmann & Engel  2007:  105)  because 
“relationship  of  loyalty  and  dependence  pervade  the  formal  political  and  administrative 
system” (Bratton & van de walle 1994: 458). Moreover, it is believed to be difficult to predict 
the activities of state agencies and government agencies may not be able to deliver public 
services properly (Erdmann & Engel 2007: 105-6). In the case of Ethiopia, such trends were 
observed  during  the  election  campaign,  election  administration  and  in  the  compliant 
investigation process of the May 2005 election. There were instances where the ruling party 
candidates used vote buying  as instruments of securing political support while campaigning in 
rural areas (Lefort  2010: 440, Aalen &  Tronvoll 2009: 197).  There were also problems of 
using state institutions and resources for campaign purpose by the ruling party (Carter 2005: 
16). This has showed the existing overlap in the functions of government and EPRDF party at 
the regional and zonal level (ibid). Despite the unparalleled  opening of the public media in the 
pre -election period, the post-election  period was characterized by the ruling party  monopoly 
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the  state media (EUEom 2005: 16). In the post- election period, the NEBE has contributed to 
substantial delays in the counting of votes and aggregation of results (Carter 2009: 22). The 
electoral commission is appointed to administer elections by the one party dominated federal 
parliament  and  the  chairman  of  the  NEBE is  simultaneously the  chairman  of  the  federal 
supreme court (EUEom 2005: 15). This resulted in the opposition parties lack of trust on the 
NEBE activities in particular and on the overall electoral process in general (ibid). Opposition 
parties  also  stressed  the   partiality of  the  NEBE in   the  complaints  investigation  process 
(Carter  2009: 31).  They alleged that the NEBE sided with EPRDF in the decisions  made 
within the  complaint review boards and in the compliant investigation panels (ibid). Reports 
show that the boards and the panels are organized of three parties ie. one from the opposition, 
one from the ruling party and one from the NEBE and  decisions are made within these bodies 
by majority vote ie. 2:1 and in most cases the opposition were on the loser side (EUEom 2005: 
28).
4.2.1.2 Ethnic and Political Party Cleavages
Existing cleavages within the society as well as nature of actors participating in politics are 
among the important factors which  determine whether elections become peaceful or violent 
(Høglund 2009: 420). In the case of  Ethiopia, the existing cleavage in the country is mainly 
ethnicity and ethnic federalism is the basis for organizing the state since the fall of the Derg 
regime and the coming into power of EPRDF in 1991 (Aalen 2006: 245). Ethnicity has also 
became a major factor which  determined the nature of actors that  participated in the May 
2005  election.  For  instance  the  ruling  party  EPRDF  (Ethiopian  People  Revolutionary 
Democratic Front) is composed of political parties organized along ethnic lines (ibid: 251). 
These political parties were warring factions along ethnic lines in the pre 1991 period (ibid). 
They transformed themselves  into  effective  political  parties  shortly  before  the  transitional 
period from the long lasted civil war (ibid). The other competing political party UEDF (United 
Ethiopian  Democratic  Forces)   has   also   ethnic  based  parties  within  itself  (ibid:  253). 
However the main contending political party ie. CUD (Coalition for Unity and Democracy)  is 
a program-based political party (ibid). It has been found out that party formations along ethnic 
lines mostly stimulates stiff competition among themselves but  prevents cooperative relations 
and threaten the overall stability of the political arena (Reilly 2008: 178). In the case of the 
May 2005 election, there were instances where the ethnic based ruling party ie. EPRDF used 
violence to promote narrow and extremist political ends (Aalen 2006: 254). With regard to 
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ideological differences among competing parties, there was a significant difference between 
the ethnic based ruling party and program based opposition party ie. CUD and this was having 
a  polarizing  effect  during  election  campaign  (Aalen  2006:  253).  It  is  argued  that  due  to 
prevalence  of  ethnic  and  clientelist  politics  makes  it  is  very  difficult  for  program based 
political parties to effectively compete and secure significant support (Van de walle 2007: 67, 
Reilly 2008: 178). In the case of the May 2005 election,  although the CUD managed to secure 
significant support mainly from urban areas, found it difficult to do the same in the remote 
rural areas due to the ethnic and clientelist politics  of EPRDF (Haberson 2005: 148,152). 
Consequently,  the  CUD  forwarded  complaints  on  the  results  of  elections  in  many  rural 
constituencies and preferred to organize protest and civic disobedience as a means of political 
struggle in the post election period  (ibid: 152-153).
4.2.1.3 Use of Violence and Culture of Impunity
Culture  of  violence  prevails  in  societies  that  experienced  political  violence  for  prolonged 
periods and makes the violent acts of state and non state actors acceptable and tolerable at 
societal  as well as individual level (Steenkemp 2005: 253, Høglund 2009: 421). From its 
modern political history one can understand that Ethiopia is a country which has undergone 
through longstanding civil wars and violent conflicts (Smith 2009: 871). The mostly agrarian 
society of Ethiopia has also become tolerant of the violent acts of state actors for long years. 
Scholars argued that one of the factors that contributed for the persistence of both cultures of 
violence and impunity is the weakness of state institutions (Steenkemp 2005: 259, Høglund 
2009: 421). Similar to several post conflict societies, the Ethiopian government institutions at 
national  and  local  level  are  mostly  unaccountable,  non-transparent,  politically  partial  and 
financially unstable (Jarstad 2008: 28). Due to this they usually do  not have  the  required 
legitimacy and resource to manage widespread violence. The manner in which the government 
handled the post- May 2005 election popular protest and political violence is an evidence for 
this.  The other  contributing factor  for such culture  is  the use of  violence by state  agents. 
(Steenkemp 2005: 258, Høglund 2009: 421). In the case of the May 2005 election, the security 
apparatus  of  the  Ethiopian  state  such  as  the  police  and  armed  forces  have   committed 
countrywide human right violations at national and local level (Amnesty 2006: 3). Political 
parties have also employed violence as a means of achieving various political objectives. For 
instance, the ruling party EPRDF has applied different forms of violence such as intimidation, 
arbitrary arrest and extra judicial killings on opposition party leaders, supporters, private 
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media journalists  and civil society activists  during the complaint investigation process in the 
post-election period (Amnesty 2006: 3). Domestic human right advocacy groups such as the 
Ethiopian  human rights council (EHRCO) have well documented  the atrocities  committed 
by  the regime in power.17 However, the government of Ethiopia has continued to refrain from 
conducting  an  independent  investigation  and  ensuring  restorative  justice  activities  on  the 
alleged human rights abuse cases (Vaughan& Tronvoll 2003: 56). The report issued by the 
inquiry  commission  established  to  investigate  the  post-May  2005  election  violence  also 
remained partial and confirmed the actions of state security agents as legitimate and denied 
that  excessive force was used.18 Recently the government  of Ethiopia   has commenced to 
make a written and defensive response to the human right abuse cases reported by the US state 
department annual report.19                      
4.2.2 Nature of the May 2005 Election of Ethiopia
 
4.2.2.1 Political Mobilization along Conflict Margins 
Conducting competitive elections renders opportunities for generating conflict and violence 
through increased  polarization  (Jarstad  2008:  29,  Høglund 2008:  85).  During  the  election 
campaign stage of the May 2005 elections, the competing political parties ie. EPRDF, CUD, 
UEDF and others have emphasized  their differences and mobilized political support along 
these lines of difference. While  the political elites of  EPRDF  have forwarded exclusive 
ethnic appeals, the opposition parties have forwarded exclusive nationalistic appeals (Aalen 
2006: 253). The EPRDF considers itself as a vanguard political party and assumes that it is 
under its rule that the rights of different ethnic groups can be recognized and protected (ibid: 
245). The opposition parties particularly CUD considers it self as a party that strives maintain 
the unity of Ethiopian state which is endangered by the politics of ethnic federalism (Harbeson 
2005:  149).  Such  extreme  nationalistic  and  ethnicized  rhetoric  has  worsened  the  existing 
tensions between these political opponents. The polarization between the competing  political 
parties and  within the society  heightened  around the  end of the election campaign. For 
instance the deputy prime minister of Ethiopia used an extreme rhetoric during one public 
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-May 2005  Election Violence in Ethiopia 
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Right Report on Ethiopia.
debate forum. The opposition political  parties were compared with the  interhamwe militia 
which was responsible for the 1994 Rwandan genocide (Aalen 2006: 254). Similar rhetoric 
was used by  a prominent opposition party leader  during  public rallies in the last weeks of the 
campaigning period (ibid). There are also instances where political rights were used for the 
wrong purposes. Politicians of the ruling party have  employed terminologies used for military 
purposes  such  as  “strongholds”  “cadres”   and  “strategies  and  tactics”   during   election 
campaign. It is argued that political parties representing diverse ethno- regional interest resort 
to violence when they realize that they are losers of the electoral process and its outcome 
(Mehler 2007: 200, Bekoe 2008: 30). This holds true in the case of the May 2005 where the 
ruling party  resorted to electoral violence when it realize that it has ceded substantial number 
of parliamentary seats to the opposition parties (Aalen&Tronvoll 2009: 195-96). Instead of 
accepting the results of the election, the ruling party preferred to manipulate the NEBE ( the 
National  Election  Board  of  Ethiopia)  during  the  counting  and  tabulation   as  well  as  the 
complaint investigation process so that the outcomes ensure its  dominance (ibid) 
4.2.2.2 Close Competition among Political Parties
Electoral contests with close margins of victory create high level of uncertainty about the final 
outcome and eventually may lead to the outbreak of violence (Sisk 2008: 9, Høglund 2009: 
421). The May 2005 election is considered as the first  truly competitive multi-party election 
that the country has ever experienced in its political history  (Harbeson 2005: 144). This time, 
competing  political  parties  have  organized  themselves  far  more  better  than  before 
(Aalen&Tronvoll 2009: 194). The opening of the public media  for the campaigning purpose 
has contributed a lot to raise the political awareness  of the voting public (Lyons 2006: 1). 
Thus the democratic nature of the May 2005 election increased  the contestation  between the 
ruling party and the other two opposition political parties. The  electoral process has taken a 
different shape in the post- election period particularly in the counting of votes  and tabulation 
of  results as well as in the complaint investigation process (EU Eom 2005: 2-3). It is argued 
that  dominant  groups  whose  political  power  is  threatened  by  the  democratic  political 
competition may resort to violence in order to secure their previous status (Jarstad 2008: 29-
30, Høglund 2008: 85-6).  The ruling party (EPRDF) has never expected that the outcome of 
this election will significantly affect  its  dominant  position in the parliament (Gudina 2007: 
11-12). However, it returned to violence when it realized that it has lost  a substantial number 
of seats during vote counting (ibid).  Claims and counter claims of winning the majority seat 
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by the ruling as well as  opposition political parties  has also overshadowed the counting  and 
aggregation process (EUEom 2005: 21). It is also argued that fears of future legal prosecution 
in  connection   with  alleged  economic  crimes  and  human  right  abuse  motivates  them to 
maintain their political office by any means (Thompson & Kuntz 2006: 117, Laakso 2007: 
230). Such fears were observed on the part of the ruling party during the May 2005 election. 
The counting and tabulation as well as the complaint investigation  processes were carried out 
in the context of widespread human right abuse by the ruling party (EUEom 2005: 28). This 
was  done   to  ensure  that  the  outcome  of  process  is  in  its  favor.  It  is   suggested  that 
marginalized groups who gained less from the political competition than their expectation may 
opt for violence as a viable means to realize their new demands (Jarstad 2008: 29-30, Høglund 
2008: 85-86). In the case of the May 2005 election, the main contending parties rejected the 
outcome  of  the  counting  as  well  as  the  complaint  investigation  process,  demanded  a 
government of national unity and  used civic disobedience as a means of political struggle to 
meet their demands (Gudina 2007: 11-12). 
4.2.2.3 Pertinent Economic and Political Stakes
In post conflict societies, competitive elections are more prone to conflict and violence due to 
the stakes involved in such elections (Høglund 2009: 422). The May 2005 election was the 
first genuine multi party election  in the pre-election period and was the most violent ones in 
the post-election period.  It  is also argued that the stakes of winning and losing a political 
office becomes extremely high within the contexts of patronage and identity politics (Sisk 
2009: 9). Ethiopia is a country where the both patronage and identity politics are pervasive 
and the May 2005 election is conducted under  such contexts (Abbink 2005: 193-94, Aalen 
2006: 253).  It is argued that  under such contexts those who hold political office enjoy greater 
control over various economic resources and public services (Sisk 2008:9, Chandra 2007: 87). 
In  the  case  of  the  May 2005 election,  evidences  show that  the  ruling  party  EDRDF has 
entrenched  its  patronized  administrative  structure  from  the  national  to  the  local  level 
(Aalen&Tronvoll  2009: 197, Lefort 2010: 440). The structure is even more entrenched in 
rural  areas  where  the  rural  community  is  dependent  upon  the  government  allocation  of 
agricultural inputs (Lefort 2010: 440). Thus for the ruling parties, political elites and their 
supporters,  losing political  office via  competitive election means losing their  patron-client 
network and the livelihoods of themselves as well as their supporters. The ruling party also 
used ethnic identity as  an important means of mobilizing political support during election 
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campaign (Aalen  2006:  260-61,  Abbink 2005:  194).  It  regarded its  political  opponents  as 
chauvinists and as agents who are working to bring back  regimes of the past ie. the Derg 
regime (Arriola  2008: 120).  During the election campaign for the May 2005 election,  the 
various parties under the umbrella of EPRDF and  ethic parties that support EPRDF have 
threatened  to  use  their  constitutional   right  of  self-  determination  including  and  up  to 
secession  if  the opposition parties win the election and hold political power (Ethiopian News 
Agency, May 17, 2005).20The risk of election related violence is also considered to be high in 
situations  where  poverty and unemployment  are  rampant  (Sisk 2009:  9,  IDEA 2009:  10). 
Ethiopia is also country where poverty and unemployment are prevalent. Studies indicate that 
during the May 2005 election,  economic inequalities and social  injustice  were among the 
major  issues  at  stake  (Smith  2009:  885)  and  economic  factors  played  a  crucial  role  in 
determining the level of support obtained by opposition political parties (Arriola 2008: 117). 
The lack of economic growth and the prevalence of poverty in the country since the coming 
into power of EPRDF were stressed by opposition parties during election campaign  and the 
inter- party debate (Smith 2009: 885, Inter Africa Group 2005)21 and the policy they forwarded 
to alleviate poverty and bring about economic development enabled them to win a significant 
popular support (Arriola 2008: 127-128).  
4.2.3  Electoral Institutions in Post-Conflict Ethiopia
 
4.2.3.1 Contests over Existing Electoral System
The  choice  of  electoral  systems  may  facilitate  conditions  favorable  for  election  related 
violence (Høglund 2009: 422, Sisk 2008: 11).  It  is suggested that deciding an appropriate 
electoral system for both ethnically alike and divided societies, requires making compromises 
among  different  contending  normative  ends  such  as  representativeness,  accountability, 
inclusiveness and accessibility …etc (Reynolds& Sisk 1998: 21-22). It is also argued that in 
the  case  of  Africa  where  neo-patrimonial  politics  is  prominent,  plural  majority  system 
performed much less in terms of ensuring representation, accountability, inclusiveness, party 
development and political stability than proportional representation system (Lindberg 2005: 
61-62).  Similar  to  other  African  regimes,  neo  patrimonialism is  an  important  institutional 
attribute of the Ethiopian state. In the case of the May 2005 election, opposition political 
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parties  asked  the Ethiopian government  to change the rules of the electoral game ie from 
simple  majority  to  proportion  representation  system  before  they  enter  into  the  electoral 
battlefield (Lyons 2006: 2). However the request was not accepted by the government and 
these parties decided to play with the existing simple majority system (ibid).  Moreover it is 
suggested that specific contextual factors such as the historical process that brought about the 
electoral system, the nature of existing societal cleavages and the nature of present political 
system  are  considered  to  require  greater  importance  while  evaluating  electoral  systems 
(Reilly&  Reynolds  2000:  429).  Regarding  the  historical  process  that  brought  about  the 
electoral system, the existing electoral system in Ethiopia is designed  in the  post-civil war 
period ie. during the constitution making process in the transition period  between 1991 and 
1993 (Smith 2009: 874). During the elections conducted since 1991 ie. in 1995, in 2000 and in 
2005,  opposition  political  parties   repeatedly  argued  that  the  existing  electoral  system is 
deliberately chosen to maximize the benefit of the ruling party and opted for the proportional 
representation system (Lyons 2006: 2). With regard to societal cleavages, Ethiopia is a country 
which is known for its ethnic diversity and its explicit use of ethnicity as a basis for organizing 
the state. The electoral system which is in practice since the coming into power of EPRDF is 
first past the post or simple majority vote (EuEom 2005: 9). Concerning the political system, 
the Ethiopian political system in principle is multi -party systems and members of the house of 
peoples representat-ives are elected by popular vote from single member constituencies and 
serve five years terms (Carter 2009: 10). It is argued that introducing winner take all electoral 
systems under  contexts where ethnic based parties are predominant and the political arena is 
less tolerant of opposing views contribute to the persistence of exclusionary and zero sum 
politics (Reilly& Reynolds  2000: 43). As it was said earlier the basis for organizing political 
parties in Ethiopia mainly is ethnicity and the ruling party is less tolerant of  opposing views 
ie. Authoritarian. Thus the first past the post (simple majority or winner take all) electoral 
system has been promoting  exclusionary and zero sum politics in the country during all the 
elections conducted since 1991.    
4.2.3.2 Weak Entity of Election Administration
Election administration might create favorable circumstances for electoral violence (Høglund 
2008:  422,  Sisk  2008:  16).  Specifically  it  is  argued  that  the  efficiency,  professionalism, 
transparency,  impartiality  and  independence  are  important  preconditions  to  come  up with 
legitimate election outcomes (Lyons 2004: 282& Sisk 1998: 169) and in contexts where these 
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prerequisites are  not  operationalized,  the risk of political  instability and electoral  violence 
becomes high (Pastor 1999: 5& Sisk 2008: 16). In the case of the May 2005 election, the 
impartiality  of  the  NEBE  was  questioned  by  opposition  political  parties  from  the  very 
beginning (EUEom 2005: 14). Such lack of confidence emanated from the very practice of 
appointment of an electoral commission  by the  one party dominated federal parliament (ibid: 
15). Thus they requested the government to establish an independent and impartial election 
administration body before the election day (Lyons 2006: 2). However their request was not 
accepted  by  the  ruling  party  dominated  parliament  to  be  considered  at  the  time  (ibid). 
Opposition parties have continued their  call  for impartial  election management body even 
after the election day and made this request a precondition to accept the election result and 
enter into the new parliament (Gudina 2007: 10).  Election observation reports show that the 
NEBE has managed the  electoral process effectively up to the election day. The pre-election 
preparation such as voter and candidate registration were generally well organized and more 
transparent  than  before  (EUEom  2005:  14).  Elections  officers  at  all  levels  have  also 
demonstrated higher  dedication and worked their  best  in  general  (ibid).  To come up with 
consultative  solutions for potential election related problems, the NEBE has also organized 
the so called joint political parties forum (ibid). Despite such positive developments, reports 
indicate  that  the  NEBE  contributed  to  substantial  delays  in  the  counting  of  votes  and 
aggregation of results (ibid).  Many of the decisions made by the NEBE in the post-election 
period have resulted in the oppositions allegation of NEBE `s impartiality (ibid). For instance, 
it  acted beyond its mandate  by restricting several civil society organizations from observing 
the election (EUEom 2005: 15). This decision was later on turned down by the federal courts 
(ibid). The complaint investigation process which was managed by the  NEBE also could not 
come up with results which can accepted by all parties (EUEom 2005: 28). Opposition parties 
alleged that the NEBE has sided with the ruling party in the decision making process at the 
compliant review board and at the complaint investigation panels (Carter 2009: 31).
4.2.3.3 Limited Regulations of Electoral Conduct
Both  formal  and  informal  rules  of  electoral  game  can  facilitate  conditions  conducive  for 
electoral conflict and violence (Høglund 2008: 421, Sisk 1998: 4). It is argued that rules of 
electoral governance cover areas like party, candidate and voter eligibility and registration, 
vote counting, tabulating and reporting techniques, election monitoring and conflict resolution 
mechanisms, campaign financing …etc (Mozzafar & Schedler 2002: 7-8). In the case of the 
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May 2005 election, these formal rules and regulations were present and were considered by 
election observers as sufficient to  conduct democratic elections. The 1994 constitution, the 
1995 electoral law (amended before the 2005 election) and regulation no. 1 issued by the 
NEBE were the major legal instruments governing the holding of elections (EUEom 2005: 8). 
However, a range of electoral rules and regulations were set before the 2010 national election 
which also showed the gaps in terms of sufficient  legal instrument  during the May 2005 
election.  Scholars argue that electoral authoritarian regimes of many newly democratizing 
countries adopt and practice different sets of informal rules that make electoral completion 
undemocratic (Schedler 2006: 3). One of such rules is imposing different kinds of restrictions 
on the political rights and civil liberties of citizens (Schedler 2006: 3,Wigell 2008: 13). The 
decision made by the NEBE to restrict civil society organization from observing the May 2005 
election is a show case of such rules (EU Eom 2005: 15). The other strategy is preserving key 
political  domains  and positions  away from electoral  competition (Schedler  2006:3,  Wigell 
2008: 13). For instance, different laws which restricts the activities of  opposition parties and 
the civil society were adopted by the ruling party dominated parliament in the post-May 2005 
election period (Aalen& Tronvoll 2009: 199). Another important strategy is excluding political 
opponents from the electoral game and fragmenting their overall organization (Schedler 2006: 
3, Wigell 2008: 13).  In the post-May 2005 election period, opposition parties which claimed 
electoral  irregularities  were  excluded from the  political  sphere  ie.  their  organization  were 
raided and leaders were imprisoned (EUEom 2005: 23). These regimes also consider vote 
buying as a vital strategy to win electoral competition (Case 2006: 103, Wigell 2008: 242). 
This strategy was also used by the ruling EPRDF party to secure political support from the 
rural communities during the May 2005 election  (Aalen& Tronvoll 2009: 197, Lefort 2010: 
440). Another key strategic choice made by these regimes is electoral fraud (Case 2006: 104, 
Wigell 2008: 242). The  ruling party turned its strategy from free competition  to electoral 
manipulation when it realized that it has lost significant number of seats in the new federal 
parliament (Aalen& Tronvoll 2009: 195-96). Intimidation can also be prioritized  as a more 
reliable strategy of securing political support by such regimes (Case 2006: 104, Wigell 2008: 
242). The counting and tabulation as well as the complaint investigation process of the May 
2005 election were conducted under such context (EUEom 2005: 21,28).
In this chapter, I have presented an analysis on the causes of the 2005 electoral violence in 
Ethiopia. Firstly I have explained the empirical fact on the May 2005 election by categorizing 
it into pre-election, election day and post-election period. Secondly, I have analyzed the causes 
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of the 2005 electoral violence. One of the causes for such violence is related to the nature of 
politics in contemporary Ethiopia . Here neo-patrimonial and authoritarian politics, ethnic and 
political party (conflict) cleavages, use of violence and culture of  impunity are considered as 
causes for this violence. The other cause for this violence is related to the nature of the May 
2005 election. Here political mobilization along conflict margins, close competition among 
political parties and pertinent socio-economic stakes of  this election are regarded as causes 
for  such  violence.  Another  cause  for  such  violence  is  related  to  the  nature  of  electoral 
institutions in post-conflict Ethiopia. Here contests over existing electoral systems, limited as 
well  as  informal  rules  of  electoral  conduct  and  weak  election  administration  entity   are 
considered as causes for this violence.
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                                                      Conclusion
The May 2005 national election of Ethiopia is considered as  the first true multi-party election 
that the country experienced in its political history. The pre-election period and the election 
day were relatively peaceful and democratic. There was a huge voter turnout and competing 
political parties were better organized than before. Moreover the public media was open for 
political debate and international election observers were present. However the post-election 
period was marred with violence due to disputes among the contending parties over election 
results.  The post-election violence led to  country wide human right  abuses and a political 
deadlock which lasted for two years. Most of the disputed issues have remained unresolved 
until now and several new legislations that restrict political rights and democratic spaces were 
implemented since then. Thus the main question that should be addressed here is: How do an 
election which was peaceful and democratic in the pre-election period and during the election 
day become violent and autocratic in the post-election period ? 
Theories on electoral violence have forwarded explanations concerning how election related 
violence is caused. They suggest that there are multiple reasons ie. enabling conditions and 
triggering factors for electoral violence to happen particularly in post conflict societies. One of 
the causes for such violence is related to the nature of politics in these societies. Here  neo-
patrimonial  and  authoritarian  politics,  ethnic  and  political  party  (conflict)  cleavages  and 
cultures of violence and impunity are considered as causes of electoral violence. The other 
cause for electoral violence is related to the nature of elections in these societies. Here political 
mobilization along conflict margins, close competition among political parties  and pertinent 
socio-economic stakes involved in such elections are regarded as causes for such violence. 
Another  cause  for  such  violence  is  related  to  the  nature  of  electoral  institutions  in  these 
societies. Here contests over existing electoral systems, limited rules of electoral conduct and 
weak election administration entity  are considered as causes for such violence.
The theoretical framework of electoral violence also explains the case of the 2005 electoral 
violence in Ethiopia.  One of the causes for the 2005 electoral violence in Ethiopia is related to 
the nature of Ethiopian politics. Firstly, the regime in power in Ethiopia is identified by studies 
as  a  neo  patrimonial  ones.  There  were  instances  of   vote  buying  and  the  use  of  state 
institutions and resources for campaign purposes. The institution which administers national 
and regional elections also lacked the required partiality. Secondly, other than becoming the 
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basis for organizing the state, ethnicity has become a major factor which determined the nature 
of actors participating in the May 2005 election. Besides the ideological differences  among 
competing parties, ethnic and clientelist politics were prevalent during this election. Thirdly, 
both cultures of violence and impunity continued to persist in contemporary Ethiopian politics. 
This was mainly due to  the weakness of state institutions and  the use of violence by state 
agents. The government also failed to conduct independent investigations on alleged human 
right abuse cases. 
The other cause for this violence is related to the nature of the May 2005 national election. 
Firstly  there  was  political  mobilization  along  conflict  margins.  Extreme  ethnicized  and 
nationalistic  rhetoric  were  used  by  leaders  of  competing  parties.  The  ruling  party  which 
represented diverse ethno-regional interest  resorted to violence when it realized that it  has 
ceded significant votes to opposition parties. Secondly there was close competition among 
contending political parties. The democratic nature of the May 2005 election increased the 
contestation  between  the  ruling  and the  other  two opposition  political  parties  in  the  pre- 
election period. However ,the counting and tabulation as well as the complaint investigation 
processes of the post-election period were carried out in the context of widespread human 
right  abuse by the ruling party.  Thirdly,  socio-economic stakes  were also involved in  this 
election. Ethiopia is a country where both patronage and identity politics are pervasive. Thus 
the stakes of winning and losing a political office became extremely high under such contexts. 
Ethiopia  is  also  a  country  where  poverty  and  unemployment  are  rampant.  So  economic 
inequalities and social injustice were among the major issues at stake during this election. 
Another cause for such violence is related to the nature of electoral institutions in Ethiopia. 
Firstly  there  were  contests  over  existing  electoral  system.  Opposition  political  parties 
requested the government to change the electoral system from simple majority to proportional 
representation system. But the request was not accepted by the government and the parties 
decided  to  play  with  the  existing  system.  Secondly  there  were  limited  rules  of  electoral 
conduct.  Besides,  different  sets  of  informal  rules  which  made  the  electoral  competition 
undemocratic  were  implemented.  This  includes  electoral  fraud,  intimidation,  vote  buying, 
imposing different restrictions on the political rights of citizens...etc. Thirdly there was weak 
election administration entity. Opposition political parties questioned the impartiality of the 
NEBE from the very beginning and their request to establish independent election 
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administration body was not accepted by the government. NEBE`s handling of the counting 
and tabulation as well as the complaint investigation processes also resulted in the continued 
allegation of its impartiality by opposition parties.
In general, we can argue that the causes of the 2005 electoral violence in Ethiopia  are related 
to the nature of Ethiopian politics,  the nature of the May 2005 election and the nature of 
electoral institutions in Ethiopia. From the discussions made on the analysis chapter of this 
thesis, we can conclude that the theoretical framework of electoral violence in post-conflict 
societies  also  explains  the  case of  the  2005 electoral  violence  in  Ethiopia  in  a  very well 
manner.
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                                                      Appendix 
I.  List of political parties that formed the various coalitions during the May 
2005 election
                 Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front
                 - Amhara People’s Democratic Movement
                 - Oromo Democratic Organization
                 - Southern Ethiopia People’s Democratic Movement
                 - Tigrayan People's Liberation Front 
                
                Coalition for Unity and Democracy
                 - All Ethiopia Unity Party
                 - Ethiopian Democratic League
                 - Rainbow Ethiopia: Movement for Democracy and Social Justice 
                 - UEDP – MEDHIN
         
                 United Ethiopian Democratic Forces
                - All Amhara People’s Organization
                - Ethiopian Democratic Unity 
                - Ethiopian Social Democratic Federal Party
                - Oromo National Congress
                - Southern Ethiopia People’s Democratic Coalition
         
                Unity of Southern Ethiopian Democratic Forces
                - Dawro People’s Democratic Movement
                - Gamo Democratic Union
                - Gamo-Gofa People’s Democratic Unity
         
                Southern Ethiopia Peoples’ Democratic Coalition
                - BurJi People’s Democratic Organization
                - Dawro Peopl’s Democratic Movement
                - Gedio People’s Democratic Organization
                - Gurage People’s Democratic Front
                - Hadiya Nation Democratic Organization
                - Kefa Administrative Region People’s Democratic Union
                - Kembeta People’s Congress
                - Omo People’s Democratic Front
                - Omo People’s Democratic Union
                - Sidama Liberation Movement
                - Sodo Gordena People’s Democratic Organization
                - Tembaro People’s Democratic Union
                - Wolayita People’s Democratic Front
                - Yem Nationality Democratic Movement
         
                                                                                                   Source (Eu-Eom 2005: 33)
II. List of local institutions from which relevant materials were obtained 
  
   Governmental Institutions 
  
  1. National Election Board of Ethiopia       
   2. Ethiopian Human Rights Commission 
   3. Government Communication  Affairs.
  4. House of Peoples Representatives 
  5. Federal Police Commission  
  6. Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation 
  7. Ethiopian News Agency 
  8. Federal High Court 
  
  Non-Governmental Organizations
   
   9.  Human Rights Council. 
   10. Christian Relief and Development Agency 
   11. Inter Africa Group
   12. Organization for Social Development 
   13. Justice for All 
  
   Inter-Governmental organizations
   14. Forum for Social Studies 
   15. Institute for Security Studies
   16. School of Journalism and Communications       
   17. Ethiopian International Institute for  Peace and  Development 
   Political Parties
   18. Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front
   19. Coalition for Unity and Democracy Party
   20. United Ethiopian Democratic Forces
   Book Shops 
   21.A private book shop  
                                       
III. List of  Abbrevations 
     
      AAU-  Addis Ababa University        
     AEUP-  All Ethiopian Unity Party
      AI-  Amnesty International 
      AU-EOT-  African Union Election Observer Team
      CIP-  Complaint Investigation Panel
      CIPEV-   Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence
      CRB-  Complaint Review Board
      CUD -  Coalition for Unity and Democracy
      EDP-  Ethiopian Democratic Party
      EHRCO-  Ethiopian Human Rights Council
      EISA-   Electoral Institute of South Africa
      ENA-  Ethiopian News Agency
      EPRDF-  Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front
      EU-EOM-  European Union Election Observation Mission
      FES-  Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
      GOE-  Government of Ethiopia
      HRW-  Human Rights Watch
      IAG-  Inter Africa Group
      ICCPR-  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
      IDEA-  International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
      IFES-  International Foundation for Electoral Systems
      IPI-   International Peace Institute
      KNCHR-  Kenya National Commission On Human Rights
      NEBE-  National Electoral Board of Ethiopia
      NIC-   National Intelligence Council
      NORDEM-  Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights
      SIDA-  Swedish International Development Agency
      SNNPR-  Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region
      UDJP-   Unity for Democracy and Justice Party
      UEDF-  United Ethiopian Democratic Front
      UiT-  University of Tromsø
      UNDP-  United Nations Development Program
      USAID-  United States Agency for International Development
      USIP-  United States Institute for Peace
      
      
    
      
    
       
  
      
    
      
                                                                   
                                                                                                                                            
IV. Political Map of  Ethiopia 
Source:  http://www.ezilon.com/maps/africa/ethiopia-maps.html
